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ABSTRACT

Malicious JavaScript has become an important attack vector for software exploitation attacks
and imposes a severe threat to computer security. In particular, three major class of problems,
malware detection, exploit diagnosis, and exploits mitigation, bring considerable challenges to
security researchers. Although a lot of research efforts have been made to address these threats,
they have fundamental limitations and thus cannot solve the problems.
Existing analysis techniques fall into two general categories: static analysis and dynamic
analysis. Static analysis tends to produce inaccurate results (both false positive and false negative)
and is vulnerable to a wide series of obfuscation techniques. Thus, dynamic analysis is constantly
gaining popularity for exposing the typical features of malicious JavaScript. However, existing
dynamic analysis techniques possess limitations such as limited code coverage and incomplete
environment setup, leaving a broad attack surface for evading the detection.
Once a zero-day exploit is captured, it is critical to quickly pinpoint the JavaScript statements
that uniquely characterize the exploit and the payload location in the exploit. However, the
current diagnosis techniques are inadequate because they approach the problem either from a
JavaScript perspective and fail to account for “implicit” data flow invisible at JavaScript level, or
from a binary execution perspective and fail to present the JavaScript level view of exploit.
Although software vendors have deployed techniques like ASLR, sandbox, etc. to mitigate
JavaScript exploits, hacking contests (e.g.,PWN2OWN, GeekPWN) have demonstrated that the

latest software (e.g., Chrome, IE, Edge, Safari) can still be exploited. An ideal JavaScript exploit
mitigation solution should be flexible and allow for deployment without requiring code changes.
To combat malicious JavaScript, this dissertation addresses these problems through enriched
executions, which explore arbitrary paths for detection, preserve JS-binary semantics for
diagnosis, and perturbs memory with chaff code for mitigation.
Firstly, JSForce, a forced execution engine for JavaScript, is proposed and developed to
improve the detection results of current malicious JavaScript detection techniques. It drives an
arbitrary JavaScript snippet to execute along different paths without any input or environment
setup. While increasing code coverage, JSForce can tolerate invalid object accesses while
introducing no runtime errors during execution.
Secondly, JScalpel, a system that utilizes the JavaScript context information from the
JavaScript level to perform context-aware binary analysis, is presented for JavaScript exploit
diagnosis. In essence, it performs JS-Binary analysis to (1) generate a minimized exploit script,
which in turn helps to generate a signature for the exploit, and (2) precisely locate the payload
within the exploit. It replaces the malicious payload with a friendly payload and generates a PoV
for the exploit.
Thirdly, ChaffyScript, a vulnerability-agnostic mitigation system, is introduced to block
JavaScript exploits via undermining the memory preparation stage. Specifically, given suspicious
JavaScript, ChaffyScript rewrites the code to insert memory perturbation code, and then generates
semantically-equivalent code. JavaScript exploits will fail as a result of unexpected memory
states introduced by memory perturbation code, while the benign JavaScript still behaves as
expected since the memory perturbation code does not change the JavaScript’s original semantics.
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1

1. INTRODUCTION
JavaScript has been a popular programming language for decades. JavaScript engines are now
embedded in many other types of host software, including client-side web browsers (e.g.,
Chrome, FireFox, Internet Explorer), server-side in web servers and databases (e.g. Node.js), and
in non-web programs such as word processors and PDF software (e.g. Adobe Reader).
Malicious JavaScript take advantage of the interactive nature of JavaScript to exploit binary
vulnerabilities (e.g., use-after-free, heap/buffer overflow) of host software that are otherwise
difficult to exploit. JavaScript provides attackers with a much easier way to conduct heap
spraying [1], information leakage [2], and shellcode generation. Figure 2.3 presents a typical
malicious JavaScript that exploit the vulnerability of IE to gain remote code execution. Malicious
JavaScript are leveraged by the exploit kits used in drive-by-download attacks to remotely exploit
the client side vulnerabilities to install malware on the victim machine. This has led to the
emergence of an ”Exploit-as-a-Service” paradigm within the malware ecosystem [3].
Malicious JavaScript has become an important attack vector for software exploitation attacks.
Attacks in browsers, as well as PDF files containing malicious embedded JavaScript, are typical
examples of how attackers launch attacks using JavaScript. According to a recent report from
Symantec [4], there are millions of victims attacked by malicious JavaScript on the Internet each
day. In particular, three major class of problems, malware detection, exploit diagnosis, and
exploits mitigation, bring considerable challenges to security researchers. Although a lot of
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research efforts have been made to address these threats, they have fundamental limitations and
thus cannot solve the problems.

Malware Detection In recent years, a number of techniques [5–13] have been proposed to
detect malicious JavaScript code. Due to the dynamic features of the JavaScript language, static
analysis [11, 14–16] can be easily evaded using obfuscation techniques [17]. Consequently,
researchers rely upon dynamic analysis [5–7] to expose the typical features of malicious
JavaScript. More specifically, these approaches rely upon visiting websites or opening PDF files
with a full-fledged or emulated browser/PDF reader and then monitoring the different features
(eval strings [7], heap health [10], etc.) for detection.
However, the typical JavaScript malware is designed to execute within a particular
environment, since they aim to exploit specific vulnerabilities, as opposed to benign JavaScript,
which will run in a more environment-independent fashion. Fingerprinting techniques [18] are
widely adopted by JavaScript malware to examine the runtime environment. A dynamic analysis
system may fail to observe some malicious behaviors if the runtime environment is not configured
as expected. Such configuration is quite challenging because of the numerous possible runtime
environment settings. Hence, existing dynamic analysis systems usually share the limitations of
limited code coverage and incomplete runtime environment setup, which leave attackers with a
broad attack surface to evade the analysis.

Exploit Diagnosis Once a ”zero-day” JavaScript attack is captured, it must be analyzed and its
inner-workings understood quickly so that proper defenses can be deployed to protect against it or
similar attacks in the future. Unfortunately, this analysis process is tedious, painstaking, and
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time-consuming. From the analysis perspective, an analyst seeks to answer two key questions: (1)
Which JavaScript statements uniquely characterize the exploit? And (2) Where is the payload
located within the exploit? The answer to the first question results in the generation of an exploit
signature, which can then be deployed via an intrusion detection system (IDS) to discover and
prevent the exploit. The answer to the second question allows an analyst to replace the malicious
payload with an amicable payload and use the modified exploit as a proof-of-vulnerability (PoV)
to perform penetration testing.
Prior exploit analysis solutions have attempted to analyze exploits at either the JavaScript
level [5, 9–11, 19, 20] or the underlying binary level [21–25]. While binary level solutions
execute an exploit and analyze the underlying binary execution for anomalies, they are unaware
of any JavaScript level semantics and fail to present the JavaScript level view of the exploit.
JavaScript level analysis fails to account for implicit data flows between statements because any
DOM/BOM APIs invoked at the binary level are invisible at the JavaScript level. Unfortunately,
implicit flows are quite common in attacks and are often comprised of seemingly random and
irregular operations in the JavaScript that achieve a precise precondition or a specific trigger
which exploits a vulnerability in the binary. The semantic gap between JavaScript level and
binary level during the analysis makes it challenging to automatically answer the 2 key questions.

Exploit Mitigation JavaScript has been used to exploit the vulnerabilities found in software. A
typical JavaScript exploit can be divided into three stages. (1). Pre-Exploitation. This stage
examines the versions of underline operating system and software to determine exploits
configuration. (2). Exploitation. This stage prepares the memory, triggers the vulnerability,
disclosures the memory information, injects the payload and achieves the code execution. (3).
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Post-Exploitation. After stage (2), this stage has gained the execution of code. But it requires
Return Oriented Programing (ROP) to bypass DEP, and then executes payload, keeps persistent in
the infected system.
To mitigate such kind of attacks, different approaches have been proposed. At JavaScript
level, approaches like BrowserShield [26], instrument the sensitive JavaScript operations to stop
known attacks by matching the predefined policies. Program hardening approaches like Control
Flow Integrity [27], Code Pointer Integrity [28], ROP mitigation [29, 30], etc., stop the attacks by
defeating different exploitation stages.
While these exploit mitigation techniques are constantly improving, hacking contests like
Pwn2Own [31], GeekPwn [32], etc., consistently demonstrate that the latest versions of Chrome,
Safari, Internet Explorer, and Edge can still be exploited. There are two reasons for this: First,
most of the latest proposed mitigation techniques require software or compiler tool chain changes
and thus could not be deployed promptly. For instance, ASLR-guard [33] is designed to thwart
information disclosure attacks, but requires compiler changes and cannot be quickly deployed by
software vendors. Second, the deployed mitigation techniques may fail due to newly invented
exploitation techniques (e.g., sandbox bypass technique). An ideal mitigation technique should be
flexible to deploy without requiring code changes and should subvert inevitable exploitation
stage(s).

1.1

Thesis Statement

My thesis work aims to combat malicious JavaScript through enriched executions, which
explore arbitrary paths for detection, preserve JS-binary semantics for diagnosis, and perturb
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memory with chaff code for mitigation. To achieve this goal, I propose the following three new
techniques to address the specific security problems.
(1) Forced Execution for Malicious JavaScript Detection. To battle malicious JavaScript, I
propose JSForce, a forced execution engine for JavaScript, which drives an arbitrary
JavaScript snippet to execute along different paths without any input or environment setup.
While increasing code coverage, JSForce can tolerate invalid object accesses while
introducing no runtime errors during execution.
(2) Semantics-Preserving Dissection of JavaScript Exploits. To answer the 2 key questions in
exploit diagnosis, I present JScalpel, a system that utilizes the JavaScript context information
from the JavaScript level to perform the context-aware binary analysis. In essence, it
performs JS-Binary analysis to (1) generate a minimized exploit script, which in turn helps to
generate a signature for the exploit, and (2) precisely locate the payload within the exploit. It
replaces the malicious payload with a friendly payload and generates a PoV for the exploit.
(3) Vulnerability-Agnostic Defense of JavaScript Exploits via Memory Perturbation. To
mitigate JavaScript exploits, I propose ChaffyScript, a vulnerability-agnostic mitigation
system that blocks JavaScript exploits via undermining the memory preparation stage.
Specifically, given suspicious JavaScript, ChaffyScript rewrites the code to insert memory
perturbation code, and then generates semantically-equivalent code. JavaScript exploits will
fail as a result of unexpected memory states introduced by memory perturbation code, while
the benign JavaScript still behaves as expected since the memory perturbation code does not
change the JavaScript’s original semantics. ChaffyScript does not require any code change of
host software and is flexible to deploy.
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2. BACKGROUND
The drive-by-download attacks drive the emergence of “Exploit-as-a-Service” paradigm on the
malware ecosystem [34]. These attacks, mostly launched via malicious JavaScript, have attracted
a lot of research efforts both from academia and industry. In this chapter, the inner-workings of
JavaScript exploits are first discussed to demonstrate how JavaScript is used to launch the attack.
Then a discussion on the related work of detection, diagnosis, and mitigation for malicious
JavaScript is presented to illustrate an overview of current research on malicious JavaScript.

2.1

JavaScript Exploits

JavaScript has been a popular programming language for decades. JavaScript engines are now
embedded in many other types of host software, including client-side web browsers (e.g.,
Chrome, FireFox, Internet Explorer), server-side in web servers and databases (e.g. Node.js), and
in non-web programs such as word processors and PDF software (e.g. Adobe Reader).
The interactive nature of JavaScript allows malicious JavaScript to take advantage of binary
vulnerabilities (e.g., use-after-free, heap/buffer overflow) of host software that are otherwise
difficult to exploit. JavaScript provides attackers with a much easier way to conduct heap
spraying [1], information leakage [2], and shellcode generation. The exploit kits used in
drive-by-download attacks leverage JavaScript code to remotely exploit the client side
vulnerabilities to install malware on the victim machine. This has led to the emergence of an
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Fig. 2.1.: The number of code execution vulnerabilities discovered in popular web browsers
(Chrome, Edge, IE, Safari, and FireFox) reported by CVEDetails [35]

Pre-Exploitation

Exploitation

Post-Exploitation

OS Identification
Software Identification
Version Identification

Memory Preparation
Vulnerability Preparation
Memory Disclosure
Payload Preparation
Code Execution

Return Oriented Programming
Payload Execution
Continuation-of-Execution
Persistence

Fig. 2.2.: The overall exploitation stages

”Exploit-as-a-Service” paradigm within the malware ecosystem [3]. As illustrated in Figure 2.1,
in popular web browsers, hundreds of code execution vulnerabilities are still discovered every
year. This provides the attacker with a broad attack surface.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the high level stages of JavaScript exploits [36]. In the pre-exploitation
stage, malware fingerprints the victim machine to determine the OS version and target software
and then launches the corresponding exploit. The exploitation stage triggers the vulnerability,
bypassing exploit mitigation techniques (e.g., ASLR, EMET [37], Control Flow Guard [38]) and
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Fig. 2.3.: (a) describes the components of a modern exploit, (b) presents the relevant JavaScript
code involved in Aurora Exploit and (c) presents the underlying code execution that results in
use-after-free, (d) presents the assembly code for function GetDocPtr.

diverts the code execution to the injected payload. The post-exploitation stage executes a
Return-Oriented-Programming (ROP) payload to bypass DEP, drops the malicious payload while
attempting to evade detection from endpoint security products.

2.1.1

Anatomy of a JavaScript Attack

Modern JavaScript attacks can be compartmentalized into four general components.
Figures 2.3 (a) and (b) show these four components within the Aurora exploit. Below, we briefly
describe the four components.
Obfuscation: From the perspective of an attacker, the identity of the exploit server and the
arsenal of exploits – especially zero-day exploits – must be obfuscated to avoid detection by
anti-malware analyzers. For example, in Figure 2.3 JavaScript obfuscation is used to perform a
document.write("Get payload") operation. Malicious scripts often use
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Fig. 2.4.: Non-executable (ROP) and executable payloads used in an exploit.

document.write() to inject code components at runtime. In Figure 2.3(a), the Aurora script
iterates over this object and finds the document object at runtime. Simple static
analysis-based scanners cannot identify that “i[x][y]” is actually a document.write()
operation. Several other obfuscation techniques are employed by attackers to systematically
defeat various analysis techniques [39]. On the de-obfuscation front, several solutions have been
proposed to deobfuscate JavaScript (e.g., Wepawet [5], JSUnpack [7]).
Fingerprinting: An exploit uses fingerprinting to glean information about victim’s environment.
With such information, exploits specific to vulnerable components are launched to compromise
the victim process. For example, in Figure 2.3(a), the Aurora exploit is only performed if the type
of the browser is identified as being Microsoft Internet Explorer (“MSIE”). Exploit kits are
known to use PluginDetect [40] to fingerprint browsers.
Payload Injection: The exploit injects a malicious payload into the victim process. Payloads can
be broadly categorized as executable or non-executable payloads. Figure 4.4 presents the
payloads and the flow of execution in modern exploits. The goal is to execute a malicious
payload, but since the wide deployment of data execution prevention (DEP), the page containing
the executable payload cannot be directly executed. First, return-oriented programming (ROP) is
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used to make a page executable by invoking VirtualProtect() on Windows or
mprotect() on Linux. Then, control is transferred to the malicious executable code.
In fact, though uncommon, it is possible for attacks to introduce gadgets [41]. Though our
solution makes no assumptions about how the payload is stored, or what statements are used to
inject the payload, the payload is typically injected using an encoded string that contains the
executable. The statements that inject the payload are usually independent of the exploit code.
Payload detection can be challenging because it is possible for both executable and
non-executable payloads to reside within the same string.
Exploitation: In this step, using one or more carefully crafted JavaScript statements, the
vulnerability in the victim process is exploited. The statements may seem random and may lack
data-dependencies, but they often involve a combination of explicit and implicit data dependency.
Consider the exploit statements for the Aurora exploit presented in Figure 2.3(b, c and d). (b)
presents the HTML (statement 1) and JavaScript (2-26) statements that exploit a use-after-free
vulnerability in mshtml.dll of Internet Explorer browser. Figures 2.3(c and d) present the
underlying C++ and assembly code that is executed as a part of the exploit. Statement 18 corrupts
the memory that was freed in statement 10. The corrupted memory is utilized in a call
instruction arising from statement 26. All the statements in Figures 2.3(c) are pertinent to the
exploit.

2.1.2

Unique Features of Malicious JavaScript

From the discussion in 2.1.1, a typical malicious JavaScript has two unique features- dynamic
nature and interaction between JavaScript level and binary level.
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Dynamic nature JavaScript is a high-level, dynamic, untyped, and interpreted programming
language. It supports many dynamic features [42] (e.g., call-site dynamism, eval, dynamic
typing, etc.). While providing the flexibility of programming for developers, the dynamic features
of JavaScript empower the attacker to highly obfuscate the malicious JavaScript for evasion
purpose. For instance, eval can be used to hide malicious JavaScript in String. Call-site
dynamism can be used to hide callee name within String to bypass signature-based detection
system. These dynamic features are broadly employed by malicious JavaScript in the obfuscation
process to evade the detection. This inspires us to propose JSForce, a forced execution engine, to
improve the detection rate of JavaScript analysis system.

Interaction between JavaScript level and binary level Malicious JavaScript is used to exploit
the vulnerability of host software. The complete exploitation is a close interaction process
between JavaScript level and binary level. At runtime, native functions provided by host software
are invoked to implement the semantics of interpreted JavaScript. The craft JavaScript triggers the
vulnerability in host software, and diverts the execution to the injected payload. While the
exploitation operations are specified using JavaScript, they affect the memory states and calling
context states of host software at the binary level. This close interaction between JavaScript level
and binary level inspires us the work JScalpel and ChaffyScript.

2.2

Detection

In the last few years, there have been a number of approaches to analyzing JavaScript code.
They can be roughly divided into two categories-static approach, dynamic approach.
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Static Approach. Several systems have focused on statically analyzing JavaScript code to
identify malicious web pages [11, 14–16]. ZOZZLE [11], in particular, leverages features
associated with AST context information (such as, the presence of a variable named shellcode in
the context of a loop), for its classification. Since dynamic features of JavaScript plague the static
analysis , researchers try to model those features to improve the static analysis result [43–45].
Dynamic Approach. Dynamic analysis is widely deployed to expose behaviors of obfuscated
JavaScript code. Previous work [5–7] execute JavaScript using an emulated JavaScript running
environment and acquire de-obfuscated JavaScript code. To de-obfuscate malicious JavaScript
code, Gen et al. [6] simplify the obfuscated JavaScript code by preserving the semantics of the
observational equivalence. JSGuard [8] proposed a methodology to detect JavaScript shellcode
that fully uses JavaScript code execution environment information with low false negative and
false positive. Liu et al. [46] propose a context-aware approach for detection and confinement of
malicious JavaScript in PDF by inserting context monitoring code into a document. To analyze
JavaScript code with cloaking, Kolbitsch et al. [9] uncover environment-specific malware by
exploring multiple execution paths within a single execution. CODENAME can benefit the
dynamic analysis in terms of improved code coverage and tolerance of invalid host environment
model.
Researchers also try to combine static and dynamic code features to identify malicious
JavaScript programs(Cujo [47]). More precisely, Cujo processes the static program and traces of
its execution into q-grams that are classified using machine learning techniques. Symbolic
execution [19] is also explored for malicious JavaScript analysis.
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2.3

Diagnosis

Once a malicious JavaScript attack is captured, it must be analyzed and its inner-workings
understood quickly so that proper defenses can be deployed to protect against it or similar attacks
in the future. Unfortunately, this analysis process is tedious, painstaking, and time-consuming.
Researchers have proposed different solutions for exploit diagnosis. PointerScope [21] uses type
inference on binary execution to detect the pointer misuses induced by an exploit. ShellOS [23]
built a hardware virtualization based platform for fast detection and forensic analysis of code
injection attacks. Dynamic taint analysis [22] keeps track of the data dependency originated from
untrusted user input at the instruction level, and detects an exploit on a dangerous use of a tainted
input. Panorama [24] explored whole system taint tracking for malware analysis. Chen et al., [48]
showed that pointer taintedness analysis could expose different classes of security vulnerabilities,
such as format string, heap corruption, and buffer overflow vulnerabilities. Prospector [49]
pinpoints the guilty bytes in polymorphic buffer overflows on heap or stack by tagging data from
network with an age stamp. Nevertheless, those techniques focus only on binary level diagnosis
and are not feasible for complex attacks launched using JavaScript code.

2.4

Mitigation

Mitigation techniques have been evolving with the advancement of exploitation techniques.
To name a few:

Control Flow Integrity Beginning from [27], many CFI defenses have been proposed at the
source code level[50], at the binary level [51] and at runtime[52]. Microsoft deployed control
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flow guard techniques on its products [38] to mitigate the exploits. Dachshund [53] secures
against blinded constants in JIT code by removing all constants from JavaScript code.

ROP mitigation Microsofts Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) [37] is a popular
zero-day exploit prevention utility that provides defense against stack pivot in ROP attacks.
StackArmor [54] randomizes the location of the stack, thereby making it harder for an attacker to
guess the location of a ROP payload on the stack. ROPecker [55] leverages a hardware feature,
the Last Branch Record, to detect the execution of ROP chains.

Randomization Randomization based mitigation is quite effective at stopping exploits, but is
vulnerable to information leakage and side channel attacks [56]. To stop information leakage,
ASLRGuard [33] stopped the leak of data pointers in deriving code addresses by separating code
and data, providing secure storage for code pointers, and encoding the code pointers when they
are treated as data. Buble [57] inserted holes in array objects by modifying the JavaScript engine
to stop heap spray attacks.
The above mitigation techniques usually require changes to source code or binaries and thus
cannot be deployed promptly. In addition, once deployed, they cannot be rapidly upgraded as
exploitation techniques advance.

JavaScript Rewriting JavaScript rewriting has been used by researchers to meet various
security requirements. BrowserShields [26] uses it to stop JavaScript exploits by matching
predefined vulnerability features. But it does not work for 0-day exploits. ConScript [58] rewrites
JavaScript to specify and enforce fine-grained security policies for JavaScript in the browser.
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Dachshund [53] secures against blinded constants in JIT code via removing all the constants from
JavaScript code. But Dachshund only works against JITSpray attacks.
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3. A FORCED EXECUTION ENGINE FOR MALICIOUS JAVASCRIPT
DETECTION
3.1

Introduction

Malicious JavaScript has become an important attack vector for software exploitation attacks.
Attacks in browsers, as well as PDF files containing malicious embedded JavaScript, are typical
examples of how attackers launch attacks using JavaScript. According to a recent report from
Symantec [4], there are millions of victims attacked by malicious JavaScript on the Internet each
day.
In recent years, a number of techniques [5–13] have been proposed to detect malicious
JavaScript code. Due to the dynamic features of the JavaScript language, static
analysis [11, 14–16] can be easily evaded using obfuscation techniques [17]. Consequently,
researchers rely upon dynamic analysis [5–7] to expose the typical features of malicious
JavaScript. More specifically, these approaches rely upon visiting websites or opening PDF files
with a full-fledged or emulated browser/PDF reader and then monitoring the different features
(eval strings [7], heap health [10], etc.) for detection.
However, the typical JavaScript malware is designed to execute within a particular
environment, since they aim to exploit specific vulnerabilities, as opposed to benign JavaScript,
which will run in a more environment-independent fashion. Fingerprinting techniques [18] are
widely adopted by JavaScript malware to examine the runtime environment. A dynamic analysis
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system may fail to observe some malicious behaviors if the runtime environment is not configured
as expected. Such configuration is quite challenging because of the numerous possible runtime
environment settings. Hence, existing dynamic analysis systems usually share the limitations of
limited code coverage and incomplete runtime environment setup, which leave attackers with a
broad attack surface to evade the analysis.
To solve those limitations, Rozzle [9] explores multiple environment related paths within a
single execution. But it requires a predefined environment-related profile for path exploration.
Construction of a complete profile is a challenging task because of the numerous different
browsers and plugins, especially for recent fingerprinting techniques [59, 60]. These
fingerprinting techniques do not rely upon any specific APIs, and thus Rozzle can be evaded
because the predefined profile cannot include those fingerprinting techniques. Also, Rozzle may
introduce runtime errors because it executes infeasible paths which may stop the analysis before
the malicious code is executed. Revolver [12] employs a machine learning-based detection
algorithm to identify evasive JavaScript malware. However, it is dependent upon a known sample
set and is unable to detect 0-day JavaScript malware. Although symbolic execution of
JavaScript [19] can be applied to explore all of the possible execution paths, the performance
overhead of a symbolic string solver [61] and the dynamic features of JavaScript make it
infeasible for practical use.
In this chapter, I propose JSF ORCE, a forced execution engine for JavaScript, which drives an
arbitrary JavaScript snippet to execute along different paths without any input or environment
setup. While increasing code coverage, JSF ORCE can tolerate invalid object accesses while
introducing no runtime errors during execution. This overcomes the limitations of current
JavaScript dynamic analysis techniques. Note that, as an amplifier technique, JSF ORCE does not
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rely on any predefined profile information or full- fledged hosting programs like browsers or PDF
viewers, and it can examine partial JavaScript snippets collected during an attack. As
demonstrated in Section 4.5, JSF ORCE can be leveraged to improve the detection rate of other
dynamic analysis systems without modification of their detection policies. While the high-level
concept of forced execution has been introduced in binary code analysis (X-Force [62],
iRiS [63]), we face unique challenges in realizing this concept in JavaScript analysis, given that
JavaScript and native code are very different languages by nature.
I implement JSF ORCE on top of the V8 JavaScript engine [64] and evaluate the correctness,
effectiveness, and runtime performance of JSF ORCE with 220,587 HTML files and 23,509 PDF
samples. Our experimental results demonstrate that adopting JSF ORCE can greatly improve the
JavaScript analysis results by 206.29% without any noticeable increase in false positives and with
a reasonable performance overhead.

3.2

Background and Overview

To provide the reader with a better understanding of the motivation for our system and the
problems that it addresses, we begin with a discussion of the malicious JavaScript code used in
drive-by-download attacks.

Malicious JavaScript code Malicious JavaScript code is typically obfuscated and will attempt
to fingerprint the version of the victim’s software (browser, PDF reader, etc.), identify
vulnerabilities within that software or the plugins that that software uses, and then launch one or
more exploits. Figure 3.1 shows a listing of JavaScript code used for a drive-by-download attack
against the Internet Explorer browser. Line 1 employs precise fingerprinting to deliver only
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i f ( ( n a v i g a t o r . appName . i n d e x O f ( ” M i c r o s o f t I n t e ” + ” r n e t E x p l o r e r ” ) ==
1 ) && ( n a v i g a t o r . u s e r A g e n t . i n d e x O f ( ” Windows N” + ”T 5 . 1 ” ) == 1 ) &&
( n a v i g a t o r . u s e r A g e n t . i n d e x O f ( ”MSI” + ”E 8 . 0 ” ) == 1 ) ) {
a t t = b t t + 1;
}
i f ( a t t == 0 ) {
try {
new A c t i v e X O b j e c t ( ”UM0QS4dD” ) ;
} catch ( e ) {
v a r tlMoOul8 = ’ \ x25 ’ + ’ u9 ’ + ’ \ x30 ’ + ’ \ x39 ’ + YYGRl6 ;
tlMoOul8 += tlMoOul8 ;
v a r CBmH8 = ”%u ” ;
v a r vBYG0 = u n e s c a p e ;
v a r EuhV2 = ”BODY” ;
...
}
}
setTimeout ( ” r e d i r ( ) ” , 3000) ;

Fig. 3.1.: The Malicious JavaScript Sample

selected exploits that are most likely to successfully attack the browser. Lines 5-7 contain evasive
code to bypass emulation-based detection systems. More precisely, the code attempts to load a
non-existant ActiveX control, named UM0QS4dD (line 6). When executed within a regular
browser, this operation fails, triggering the execution of the catch block that contains the
exploitation code (lines 7-14).
However, an emulation-based detection system must emulate the ActiveX API by simulating
the loading and presence of any ActiveX control. In these systems, the loading of the ActiveX
control will not raise this exception. As a result, the execution of the exploit never occurs and no
malicious activity is observed. Instead, the victim is redirected to a benign page (line 16) if the
fingerprinting or evasion stage fails. Attackers can also abuse the function setTimeout to
create a time bomb [65] to evade detection. Detection systems can not afford to wait for long
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periods of time during the analysis of each sample in an attempt to capture randomly triggered
exploits.

Challenges and Existing Techniques Static analysis is a powerful technique that explores all
paths of execution. But, one particular issue that plagues static analysis of malicious JavaScript is
that not all of the code can be statically observed. For example, static analysis cannot observe
malicious code hidden within eval strings, which are frequently exploited by attackers to
obfuscate their code. Therefore, current detection approaches [5–7] rely upon dynamic analysis to
expose features typically seen within malicious JavaScript. More specifically, these approaches
rely upon visiting websites or opening PDF files with an instrumented browser or PDF reader, and
then monitoring different features (eval strings [7], heap health [10], etc.) for detection.
However, dynamic analysis techniques suffer from two fundamental limitations. The first
limitation is limited code coverage. This becomes a much more severe limitation within the
context of analyzing malicious JavaScript. Attackers frequently employ a technique called
cloaking [66], which works by fingerprinting the victim’s web browser and only revealing the
malicious content when the victim is using a specific version of the browser with a vulnerable
plugin. Cloaking makes dynamic analysis much harder because the sample must be run within
every combination of web browser and plugin to ensure complete code coverage. The
widely-used event callback feature of JavaScript also makes it challenging for dynamic analysis
to automatically trigger code. For example, attackers can load the attack code only when a
specific mouse click event is captured, and automatically determining and generating such a
trigger event is difficult.
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The second limitation is the complexity of the JavaScript runtime environment. JavaScript is
used within many applications, and it can call the functionality of any plugin extensions supported
by these applications. For dynamic analysis, any pre-defined browser setup handles a known set
of browsers and plugins. Thus, there is no guarantee that this setup will detect vulnerabilities only
present in less popular plugins. While it is possible to deploy a cluster of machines running many
different operating systems, browser applications, and browser plugins, the exponential growth of
possible combinations rapidly causes scalability issues and makes this approach infeasible.
Rozzle [9] attempts to address this code coverage problem by exploring environment-related
paths within a single execution. For instance, because att in Figure 3.1 depends upon the
environment-related API’s output, Rozzle will execute lines 5-15 and reveal the malicious
behaviors hidden in lines 8-14 by executing both the try and catch blocks. But, it requires a
predefined environment-related profile for path exploration. Construction of a complete profile is
a challenging task because of the numerous different browsers and plugins, especially for newer
proposed fingerprinting techniques [18, 59, 60]. These new techniques do not rely upon any
specific APIs. For instance, the JavaScript engine fingerprinting technique [60] relies upon
JavaScript conformance tests such as the Sputnik [67] test suite to determine a specific browser
and major version number. There are no specific APIs used for the fingerprinting. Thus, Rozzle
cannot include it within the predefined profile and explore the environment-related paths. Rozzle
also introduces runtime errors into the analysis engine, which may stop the analysis before any
malicious code is executed. In contrast, JSF ORCE does not rely upon predefined profile for path
exploration and handles runtime errors using the forced execution model presented in
Section 3.3.1. By overcoming those limitations of Rozzle, JSF ORCE achieves greater code
coverage.
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Revolver [12] employs a machine learning-based detection algorithm to identify evasive
JavaScript malware. However, it requires that the malicious sample is present within a known
sample set so that its evasive version can be determined based upon the classification difference.
By design, it can not be used for 0-day malware detection.
Symbolic execution has also been applied to the task of exposing malware [65]. This
technique, while improving code coverage over dynamic analysis, suffers from scalability
challenges and is, in many ways, unnecessarily precise [9]. Within the context of JavaScript
analysis, symbolic execution becomes more challenging [19]. JavaScript applications accept
many different kinds of input, and those inputs are structured as strings. For example, a typical
application might take user input from form fields, messages from a server via
XMLHttpRequest, and data from code running concurrently within other browser windows. It
is extremely difficult for a symbolic string solver [61] to effectively supply values for all of these
different kinds of inputs and reason about how those inputs are parsed and validated. The rapidly
evolving JavaScript language and its host programs (browsers, PDF readers, etc.) make the
modeling of the JavaScript API tedious work. Furthermore, the dynamic features (such as the
eval function) of JavaScript make symbolic execution infeasible for many analysis efforts.

Overview

JSF ORCE, our proposed forced-execution engine for JavaScript, is an enhancement

technology designed to better expose the behaviors of malicious JavaScript at runtime. Different
detection policies can be applied to examine malicious JavaScript. While the forced execution
concept is first introduced for binary code analysis (X-Force [62]), we face unique challenges,
such as type inference and invalid object access recovery, in enabling the forced execution
concept for JavaScript.

23
We now illustrate how the forced execution of JavaScript code works. Consider the snippet
shown in Figure 3.1. JSF ORCE forces the execution through the different code paths of the
snippet. So, the exploitation code within the catch block (lines 7-14) will be executed, no
matter how the ActiveX API is simulated by the emulation-based analysis system. Moreover,
JSF ORCE will immediately invoke the callback function passed to setTimeout to trigger the
time bomb malware.
JSF ORCE’s path exploration forces line 2 to be executed, regardless of the result of the
fingerprinting statement (line 1). Since btt is not defined within the code snippet under analysis,
which is a common scenario because collected JavaScript code may be incomplete due to
multi-stages of the attack, the execution of line 2 raises a ReferenceError exception when
running within a normal JavaScript engine. When the exception is captured, JSF ORCE creates a
FakedObject named btt, which is fed to the JavaScript engine to recover from the invalid
object access. However, the type of btt is unknown at the time of FakedObject’s creation.
JSF ORCE infers the type based upon how the FakedObject is used. For example, if this
FakedObject is added to an integer, JSF ORCE will then change its type from FakedObject
to Integer. We call this faked object retyping.

3.3

JavaScript Forced Execution

This section explains the basics of how a single forced execution proceeds. The goal is to have
a non-crashable execution. We first present the JavaScript language semantics and then focus on
how to detect and recover from invalid object accesses. We then discuss how path exploration
occurs during forced execution.
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3.3.1

Forced Execution Semantics

⟨EXPRESSIONS⟩ ::= c
| x
| x.f
| x.prot
| e op e
| this
| {f1 ∶ e1 , ..., fn ∶ en }
| {function(p1 , ..., pn ){S}}
| f(a1 , ..., an )
| new f(a1 , ..., an )

CONSTANT
VARIABLE
FIELD ACCESS
PROTO ACCESS
BINARY OP
THIS
OBJECT LITERAL
FUNCTION DEF
FUNCTION CALL
NEW

⟨STATEMENTS⟩ ::= skip
| S1 ∶ S2
| varx
| x ∶= e
| x.f ∶= e
| if e then S1 else S2
| while e do S
| try{S}catch{S}finally{S}
| return e

SKIP
SEQ
VAR DECL
ASSIGN
ASSIGN
CONDITIONAL
WHILE
TRY CATCH
RETURN

Fig. 3.2.: Core JavaScript

The JavaScript Language JavaScript is a high-level, dynamic, untyped, and interpreted
programming language. Figure 3.2 summarizes the syntax of the core JavaScript, which captures
the essence of JavaScript. At runtime, the JavaScript engine dynamically interprets JavaScript
code to 1) load/allocate objects, 2) determine the types of objects, and 3) execute the
corresponding semantics. Given an arbitrary JavaScript snippet, execution may fail because of
undefined/uninitialized objects or incorrect object types. For instance, the execution of line 2 in
Figure 3.1 raises a ReferenceError exception because btt is not defined. To tolerate such
invalid object accesses, forced execution must handle such failures.
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Types:
τ ∶∶= ∑i∈T,T⊆{,u,b,s,n,o} ϕi
Rows:
% ∶∶= str:τ, %
∣ %τ
Type environments:
Γ ∶∶= Γ(x ∶ τ )
∣ ∅
Type summands
and indices:
ϕ ∶∶= Undef
ϕu ∶∶= Null
ϕb ∶∶= Bool(ξb )
ξb ∶∶= f alse ∣ true ∣ ⊺
ϕs ∶∶= String(ξs )
ξs ∶∶= str ∣ ⊺
ϕn ∶∶= Number(ξn )
ξn ∶∶= num ∣ ⊺
ϕf ∶∶= Function(this ∶ τ ; % → τ )
ϕo ∶∶= Obj(∑i∈T,T⊆{b,s,n,f,} ϕi )(%)
ϕf o ∶∶= FObj
ϕf f ∶∶= FFun

Fig. 3.3.: Syntax of JavaScript Types

The basic idea behind forced execution is that, whenever a reference error is discovered, a
FakedObject is created and returned as the pointer of the property. During the execution of the
program, the expected type of the FakedObject is indicated by the involved operation. For
instance, adding a number object to a FakedObject indicates that the FakedObject’s type
is number. When the type of a FakedObject can be determined, we update it to the
corresponding type.
Potentially, we could assign FakedObject with the type Object and reuse the dynamic
typing rules of the JavaScript engine to coerce the FakedObject to an expected type.
Nevertheless, the dynamic typing rules of the JavaScript engine are designed to maintain the
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correctness of JavaScript semantics and do not suffice to meet our analysis goal of achieving
maximized execution. This can be attributed to two reasons. First, while the JavaScript engine
can cast the FakedObject:Object to proper primitive values, it cannot cast the
FakedObject:Object to proper object types. For instance, when a FakedObject with the
type Object is used as a function object, the JavaScript engine will raise the TypeError
exception according to ECMA specification [68]. Second, the casting of FakedObject to
primitive values by the JavaScript engine can lead to unnecessary loss of precision. To understand
why, consider the following loop:
1

c = a /2;

2

f o r ( i = c ; i <10000; i ++)

3

{
memory [ i ] = nop + nop + s h e l l c o d e ;

4

5

}

Since a is not defined, a FakedObject will be created. With the built-in typing rule of the
JavaScript engine, c will be assigned the value NaN. The loop condition i < 10000 will always
evaluate to false. Thus, the loop body, which contains the heap spray code, will never be
executed. Although the path exploration of JSF ORCE will guarantee that the loop body will be
executed once, without executing the loop 10,000 times, it will likely be missed by heap spray
detection tools because of the small chunk of memory allocated on the heap.
Therefore, to overcome the above two issues, JSF ORCE introduces two new types, FObj and
FFun, to the JavaScript type system. The JavaScript type system defined in [69] is extended to
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var a = null ;
var b = c + 1;
var d = a . length ;
var func = n u l l ;
a = ” H e l l o World ” ;
v a r e = new a b c ( ) ;
i f ( b < 5) {
func = f u n c t i o n ( x ) {

return x

9
10
11
12
13
14

};
}
d = func (6) ;
v a r f = Math . a b s ( d ) ;
array [5] = f ;

Fig. 3.4.: JavaScript Sample

support these two new types. Figure 3.3 summarizes the new syntax of these JavaScript types.
Type FObj is for FakedObject. At the moment FakedObject is created, we assign type
FObj as the temporary type of FakedObject. It can be subtyped to any types within the
JavaScript type system. When FakedObject is used as a function object, FakedObject is
casted to FakedFunction with type FFun. The FakedFunction with type FFun can take
arbitrary input and always returns FakedObject:FObj. Following JSF ORCE’s dynamic
typing rules, a in the above loop sample will be typed to Number because it is used as a
dividend. c is then assigned to Number and the loop body is executed repeatedly until the loop
condition i<10000 is evaluated to false. By introducing these two new types and their typing
rules, JSF ORCE solves the two issues mentioned in the above paragraph. In the following
paragraphs, we detail the JavaScript forced execution model.

Reference Error Recovery To avoid raising ReferenceError exceptions, we introduce the
FakedObject and recover the error by creating the FakedObject whenever necessary.
There are two cases that lead to reference errors. The first case (ER 1) is a failed object lookup.
Every field access or prototype access triggers a dynamic lookup using the field or prototype’s
name as the key. If no object is found, the lookup fails. Such failures happen when the running
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environment is incomplete or some portion of the JavaScript code is missing. For example, a
browser plugin referenced by the JavaScript is not installed, or only a portion of the JavaScript
code is captured during the attack.
To handle this error, JSF ORCE intercepts the lookup process and a FakedObject named as
the lookup key is created whenever a failed lookup is captured. The corresponding parent object’s
property is also updated to the FakedObject. Line 2 in Figure 3.4 presents such an example.
The JavaScript engine searches the current code scope for the definition of c, which is not
defined. JSF ORCE returns the FakedObject as the temporary value of c so that the execution
can continue.
The second case (ER 2) occurs when the object is initialized to the value null or
undefined, but later has its properties accessed. JSF ORCE modifies the initialization process to
replace the null to a FakedObject if an object is initialized as value null or undefined.
For example, the variable a defined on line 1 in Figure 3.4 is assigned the value FakedObject
instead of null under the forced execution engine. The variable a may later be updated to
another value during execution, but this does not sabotage the execution of JavaScript code.

Faked Object Retyping When a FakedObject is used within an expression, it must be
retyped to the expected type. Otherwise, incorrect typing raises a TypeError exception and
stops the execution. JSF ORCE infers the expected type of FakedObject by how the
FakedObject is used. Figure 3.5 summarizes the dynamic typing rules introduced by
JSF ORCE. The rules are divided into the following five categories:

1) R-ASSIGN. This rule deals with assignment statements. When a FakedObject e0 is
assigned to a new value e1 , e0 is updated to the new value e1 with the type τ . The

29

R-ASSIGN
Γ ⊢lhs e0 ∶ ϕf o

R-CALL1
τ0 ⊵ Obj(F unction(this ∶ τ ′ ; ⌈0⌉ ∶ τ1 , ..., ⌈n–1⌉ ∶ τn , % → τ ))(%′ )
Γ ⊢ref e0 ∶ ϕf o /τ

Γ ⊢ e1 ∶ τ

⊢upd e0 ∶ ϕf o , %′ @τ ↤ ϕf f , Γ ⊢ref e0 (e1 , ...., en ) ∶ ϕf o / ⊥

Γ ⊢ref e0 = e1 ∶ τ
R-CALL2

τ0 ⊵ Obj(F unction(this ∶ τ ′ ; ⌈0⌉ ∶ τ1 , ..., ⌈n–1⌉ ∶ τn , % → τ ))(%′ )
Γ ⊢ref e0 ∶ τ0 /τ ′
...Γ ⊢ e(i–1) ∶ τ(i–1)
Γ ⊢ ei ∶ ϕf o
Γ ⊢ e(i+1) ∶ τ(i+1)
...

Γ ⊢ e1 ∶ τ1

Γ ⊢ en ∶ τn

⊢upd ei ∶ ϕf o @τ ↤ τi , Γ ⊢ref e0 (e1 , ...., en ) ∶ τ / ⊥
R-NEW
τ0 ⊵ Obj(F unction(this ∶ τ ′ ; ⌈0⌉ ∶ τ1 , ..., ⌈n–1⌉ ∶ τn , % → τ ))(%′ )
Γ ⊢ref e0 ∶ ϕf o /τ

R-BINOPERATOR1
Γ ⊢ e 1 ∶ ϕf o
Γ ⊢ e2 ∶ τ ′

′

⊢upd e1 ∶ ϕf o @τ ↤ τ , Γ ⊢ e1 op e2 ∶ τ ′

⊢upd e0 ∶ ϕf o , % @τ ↤ ϕf f , Γ ⊢ref new e0 (e1 , ...., en ) ∶ ϕf o / ⊥
R-BINOPERATOR2
Γ ⊢ e1 ∶ ϕf o

R-INDEX1
Γ ⊢ e1 ∶ ϕf o

Γ ⊢ e 2 ∶ ϕf o

⊢upd e1 ∶ ϕf o @τ ↤ ϕn , ⊢upd e2 ∶ ϕf o @τ ↤ ϕn , Γ ⊢ e1 op e2 ∶ τ
R UNARYOPERATOR
Γ ⊢ e1 ∶ ϕf o

R-INDEX2
Γ ⊢ e1 ∶ τ1

¬(e2 is ϕf o )

′

τ1 ⊵ Obj(ϕ1 )(%1 )

Γ ⊢ e2 ∶ ϕn

⊢upd e1 ∶ ϕf o @τ ↤ τ1 , Γ ⊢lhs e1 [e2 ] ∶ ϕf o

τ1 ⊵ Obj(ϕ1 )(%1 )

Γ ⊢ e2 ∶ ϕf o

⊢upd %1 @ϕn ↦ τ ′

⊢upd e2 ∶ ϕf o @τ ↤ ϕn , Γ ⊢lhs e1 [e2 ] ∶ τ ′

⊢upd e2 ∶ ϕf o @τ ↤ ϕn , Γ ⊢ op e1 ∶ τ

Fig. 3.5.: Typing rules

JavaScript engine handles this naturally, so no interference is required. For example,
variable a in Figure 3.4 is assigned FakedObject at line 1 by JSF ORCE. At line 4, the
variable a is retyped as a string object.
2) R-CALL1 and R-NEW. These two rules describe the typing rule for the scenario when a
FakedObject:FObj is used as a function call or by the new expression. Function calls
and the new expression both expect their first operand to evaluate to a function. So,
JSF ORCE updates the FakedObject:FObj to FakedFunction:FFun for this
situation. The FakedFunction is a special function object which is configured to accept
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arbitrary parameters. The return value of the function is set to a FakedObject:FObj so
that it can be retyped whenever necessary.
3) R-CALL2. This rule describes the case where the callee is a known function, but a
FakedObject:FObj is passed as a function parameter. JSF ORCE types the
FakedObject:FObj to the required type of the callee’s arguments. The JavaScript
language has many standard built-in libraries such as Math and Date. When a
FakedObject:FObj is used by the standard library function, we update the type based
upon the specification of the library function [68]. Currently, JSF ORCE implements
retyping for several common libraries (e.g., Math, Number, Date).
4) R-BINOPERATOR1/2 and R-UNARYOPERATOR. These three rules describe how to update
the type if the FakedObject:FObj is involved in an expression with an operator.
JSF ORCE updates the FakedObject:FObj’s type based upon the semantics of the
operator. For unary operators, it is straightforward to determine the type from the operator’s
semantics. For instance, the postfix operator indicates the type as number. For binary
operators, the typing becomes more complicated. If both operands are
FakedObject:FObj and the operator does not reveal the type of the operands,
JSF ORCE types them to number. This is because the number type can be converted to
most types naturally by the JavaScript engine. For example, the number type in JavaScript
can be converted to the string type, but it may fail to convert a string to a number.
Later during execution, if the types can be determined, JSF ORCE will update the type to the
correct type. If only one of the two operands is FakedObject:FObj, JSF ORCE
determines the type based upon the other operand’s type and the operator’s semantics.
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Statement
1: var a = null;
2:

var b = c + 1;

Action
a ↤ F akedObject
c ↤ F akedObject
c ↤ RanN umber

a.length ↤ F akedObject
4:
f unc ↤ F akedObject
5:
a ↤ ”HelloW orld”
abc ↤ F akedObject
6: var e = new abc();
abc ↤ f akedF unction
7: if(b <5)
NO ACTION
f unc ↤ f akedF unction
12: d = func(6)
d ↤ F akedObject
13: var f = Math.abs(d)
d ↤ RanN umber
array ↤ F akedObject
14: array[5] = f;
array ↤ arrayObject
array[5] ↤ f
3:

var d = a.length;
var func = null;
a = ”Hello World”;

Rule
ER 2
ER 1
R BINOPE
RATOR1
ER 1
ER 2
R ASSIGN
ER 1
R NEW
NONE
R CALL1
R ASSIGN
R CALL2
ER 1
R INDEX1
R ASSIGN

Table 3.1: Forced execution of sample in Figure 3.4

5) R-INDEX1 and R-INDEX2. These two rules describe how to update the type when there are
indexing operations. A FakedObject:FObj is updated to an ArrayObject ∶ φo
whenever a key is used as an array index to access elements of the FakedObject.
JSF ORCE creates an ArrayObject and initializes the elements to FakedObject:FObj.
The length of the ArrayObject is set to 2*CurrentIndex. If an Out-Of-Boundary access
is found, JSF ORCE doubles the length of ArrayObject. If the array index is
FakedObject, JSF ORCE types it to number and initializes it as 0, which avoids
Out-Of-Boundary exceptions. If both the index object and base object are
FakedObject:FObj, the R-INDEX2 rule is first applied to update the index object to
number, then the R-INDEX1 rule is applied to update the base object to ArrayObject.
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Example Table 3.1 presents a forced execution of the sample shown in Figure 3.4. In the
execution, the branch in lines 8-11 is not taken. At line 1, JSF ORCE assigns a
FakedObject:Fobj to a, instead of null. This is because at line 3 the access to property
length raises an exception if a is null. On line 2, we can see a FakedObject:FObj is first
assigned to c. Once c is added to 1, JSF ORCE updates the value of c to a random number. Lines
6 and 7 show that if a FakedObject:FObj is used in the function call or new expression,
JSF ORCE updates it to FakedFunction:FFun. The return value of the faked function is still
configured to FakedObject:FObj, so that at line 13, d is updated to hold a random number.
JSF ORCE also automatically recovers from other exceptions by intercepting those exceptions
to eliminate the exception condition. For example, JSF ORCE will update a divisor to a non-zero
value if a division-by-zero exception is raised.

3.3.2

Path Exploration in JSF ORCE

One important functionality of JSF ORCE is the capability of exploring different execution
paths of a given JavaScript snippet to expose its behavior and acquire complete analysis results.
In this subsection, we explain the path exploration algorithm and strategies.
In practice, attackers constantly adopt the dynamic features of JavaScript to aid in evading
detection. This results in incomplete path exploration under two circumstances. The first is when
strings are dynamically generated. For instance, document.write is often abused to inject
dynamically decoded malicious JavaScript code into the page at runtime. The second is when
event callbacks are used. As discussed in Section 3.2, attackers can abuse event callbacks to stop
the execution of malicious code. JSF ORCE solves this by employing specific path exploration
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Algorithm 1 Path Exploration Algorithm
Definitions: switches - the set of switched predicates in a forced execution, denoted by a sequence of predicate offsets
in the source file(SrcName:offset). For example, t.js ∶ 15 ⋅ t.js ∶ 83 ⋅ t.js ∶ 100 means the branch in source file t.js
with the offset 15, 83, 100 is switched. EX, W L - a set of forced executions, each denoted by a sequence of switched
predicates. preds ∶ P redicate × boolean - the sequence of executed predicates.
Input: The tested JS
Output: F U LL EX
1: F U LL EX ← ∅
2: SRC ← {JS}
3: while SRC do
4:
W L ← {∅}
5:
EX ← ∅
6:
js ← SRC.pop()
7:
while W L do
8:
switches ← W L.pop()
9:
EX ← EX ∪ switches
10:
(preds, newJS) ← E XECUTE C ODE(js, switches)
11:
SRC ← SRC ∪ newJS
12:
t ← len(switches)
13:
preds ← remove the f irst t elements in preds
14:
for all (p, b) ∈ preds do
15:
if !covered(p, ¬b) then
16:
W L ← W L ∪ switches ⋅ (p, b)
17:
end if
18:
end for
19:
end while
20:
F U LL EX ← F U LL EX ∪ {EX ∶ js}
21: end while
22: procedure E XECUTE C ODE(JS, switches)
23:
preds ← switches
24:
CBQ ← ∅
25:
newJS ← ∅
26:
for all stmt ∈ JS do
27:
if isN oneEvalF unctionCallStmt(stmt) then
28:
if CalleeT akesStrings(stmt) then
29:
newJS ← newJS ∪ GetJSF romString(stmt)
30:
end if
31:
if CalleeRegisterCallback(stmt) then
32:
CBQ ← CBQ ∪ ExtractCBF unc(stmt)
33:
end if
34:
else if isBranchStmt(stmt) then
35:
if GetSwitch(stmt) ∈ switches then
36:
Execute according to switches
37:
else
38:
preds ← preds ⋅ GetP redicate(stmt)
39:
end if
40:
end if
41:
end for
42:
for all cb ∈ CBQ do
43:
(preds′ , newJS ′ ) ← E XECUTE C ODE(cb, ∅)
44:
newJS ← newJS ∪ newJS ′
45:
preds ← preds ⋅ preds′
46:
end for
return (preds, newJS)
47: end procedure
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strategies. Within the execution, if faked functions take strings as input, JSF ORCE examines the
strings and executes the code if they contain JavaScript. This strategy is only applied on faked
functions since original functions (eval) can handle the strings as defined. JSF ORCE also
detects the callback registration function and invokes the callback function immediately after the
current execution terminates.
JSF ORCE treats try-catch statements as if-else statements, ie., it executes each try
block and catch block separately. Ternary operators are also treated as if-else statements:
both values are evaluated.
There are several different path exploration algorithms: linear search, quadratic search, and
exponential search [62]. The goal of path exploration in JSF ORCE is to maximize the code
coverage to improve the detection rate of malicious payload with an acceptable performance
overhead. Quadratic and exponential searches are too expensive, so JSF ORCE employs the linear
search only.
Algorithm 1 describes the path exploration algorithm, which generates a pool of forced
executions that achieve maximized code coverage. The complexity is O(n), where n is the
number of JavaScript statements. n may change at runtime because JavaScript code can be
dynamically generated. Initially, JSF ORCE executes the program without switching any
predicates since switches is initialized as ∅ (line 8) for the first time. JSF ORCE executes the
program according to the switches at line 10 and returns preds and dynamically generated
code newJS. In lines 12-17, we determine if it would be of interest to further switch more
predicate instances. Lines 11-13 compute the sequence of predicate instances eligible for
switching. Note that it cannot be a predicate before the last switched predicate specified in
switches. Switching such a predicate may change the control flow such that the specification
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in switches becomes invalid. Specifically, line 16 switches the predicate if the other branch has
not been covered. In each new forced execution, we essentially switch one more predicate.
The procedure ExecuteCode (lines 22-47) describes the execution process. It collects
dynamically generated JavaScript code (lines 28-30) and the executed predicates (lines 34-38).
The new generated JavaScript code, newJS, will be executed after the path exploration of the
current js finishes. The registered callback functions (lines 31-33) are also queued and invoked
after the current execution finishes (lines 42-46). As an example, recall the callback function
redir() used in line 16 of Figure 3.1. Instead of waiting for the timeout, JSF ORCE will trigger
the redir() function immediately after the current execution finishes.

3.4

Implementation

JSF ORCE is implemented by extending the V8 JavaScript engine [64] on the X86-64
platform. It is comprised of approximately 4,600 lines of C/C++ code and 1,500 lines of Python
code. We address some prominent challenges of its implementation in this section.

Reference Error Recovery & Faked Object Retyping In V8, an abstract syntax tree (AST) is
generated for every function, which is then compiled into native code (known as Just-In-Time
code). V8 adopts an inline caching technique [70] to accelerate property accesses. If the property
access fails, the execution jumps to the V8 runtime system which handles any inline cache
misses. If the runtime system is unable to handle an inline cache miss, either due to reference
error or type check error, it raises the corresponding exception and stops the execution.
We modify the inline cache miss handling process to enable reference error recovery and faked
object retyping. For reference error recovery, JSF ORCE creates and returns the FakedObject
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for failed object lookup by changing the V8 property access failure handling functions like
Runtime LoadIC Miss. For faked object retyping, JSF ORCE inserts additional code into
runtime methods like Runtime BinaryOpIC Miss that is executed prior to the exception
being raised. This additional code follows the rules described in Section 3.3.1 to conduct the
retyping process if the involved operation contains a FakedObject.

Predicates Flip We have two approaches available to flip the predicates. The first approach is to
flip the predicates within the Just-in-Time code. The Just-in-Time code can be optimized (inline
caching, etc.) by V8 in accordance with the execution profile. To enable predicates flipping, a
runtime function must be inserted before every branch so that JSF ORCE can manipulate the
predicate value. This approach may affect the optimization process of Just-in-Time code.
JSF ORCE takes the second approach: if the branch A of a predicate needs to be taken,
JSF ORCE replaces the other branch with this branch A. At runtime, no matter which branch is
taken, the branch A is executed. For instance, we want to take the {A} branch of the statement
if(e){A}else{B}. JSF ORCE changes it to if(e){A}else{A}, so that {A} is executed at
runtime.

Loops and Recursions

Sometimes, JSF ORCE may cause a loop to execute for a very long time,

due to the introduction of faked objects. To solve this problem, JSF ORCE inserts a time counter
for every loop statement (for...in and for...of are excluded, as they will always
terminate), and it will terminate the loop if the execution time exceeds a limit. Similarly, if
JSF ORCE forces a predicate that guards the termination of a recursive function call, a very deep
recursion may result. To address deep recursion, JSF ORCE monitors the stack depth. Once the
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maximum call stack size (defined by V8) is reached, calls to that function are omitted by
JSF ORCE.

3.5

Evaluation

In this section, we present details on the evaluation of correctness, effectiveness and runtime
performance of JSF ORCE using a large number of real-world samples.

3.5.1

Dataset & Experiment Setup

Dataset The complete dataset used for our evaluation consists of two sample sets: a malicious
sample set and a benign sample set. For the malicious set, we collected a sample set with 172,995
HTML files and 23,509 PDF files from various databases including VirusTotal [71],
Contagio [72], MalTrafficAnalysis [73], and Threatglass [74]. Among those, all samples from
VirusTotal were new samples evaluated within a month of being submitted, with the samples
provided from other sources being relatively old. For the benign sample set, we crawled the Alexa
top 100 websites [75] and collected 47,592 HTML files.

Experiment Setup For JavaScript code analysis, we leverage the jsunpack [7] tool. Jsunpack is
a widely used malicious JavaScript code analysis tool that utilizes the SpiderMonkey [76]
JavaScript engine for code execution. Six distinct configurations are predefined within jsunpack
to maximize the exploration of JavaScript code by trying different browsers and language
settings. For the sake of our evaluation, we replaced the SpiderMonkey from jsunpack with
JSF ORCE and relied upon the detection policies in jsunpack for malicious code detection. Most
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Category
True Positive
False Positive

Total
389
47,592

Detected by JSF ORCE
389
9

Percentage
100%
0.019%

Table 3.2: Correctness Results.

of our experiments are based upon the comparison between the original jsunpack and the
JSF ORCE-extended jsunpack. Note that the experiments performed within this section are only
intended to show the improvement of detection results over the original ones when adopting
JSF ORCE. The detection policy itself is another important research topic which is orthogonal to
the focus of JSF ORCE. We conducted our experiments on a test machine equipped with Intel(R)
Xeon(R) E5-2650 CPU (20M Cache, 2GHz) and 128GB of physical memory. The operating
system was Ubuntu 12.04.3 (64bit).

3.5.2

Correctness

In this section, we evaluate the correctness of the analysis result for JSF ORCE. The goals of
this evaluation are two-fold. First, we wish to know the true positive rate of our analysis results,
meaning that we wish to verify whether a JavaScript program is undoubtedly malicious if it is
tagged as one by the analysis tools. Second, we wish to understand any false positives in the
results so as to determine whether any benign JavaScript code can be mistakenly labeled as
malicious.

True positive With our first goal in mind, we queried VirusTotal [71] for malicious HTML files
and collected 389 samples which are precisely labeled with specific CVE (Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures) numbers that match CVEs listed in jsunpack. Furthermore, we
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manually reviewed each of the samples and confirmed the existence of shellcode or malicious
signatures. This step is to guarantee all the samples we tested are real malicious samples that
should be detected by our tool. Then, we analyzed the samples using jsunpack with JSF ORCE.
The experimental result is listed in the first row of Table 3.2 as “true positive”. It shows that
JSF ORCE could successfully detect all of the samples, resulting in a 100% true positive rate. To
better understand these results, we further inspected the detailed analysis results to see why our
tool tagged samples as malicious. Our inspection results revealed that all of the payload and
malicious signatures extracted by the JSF ORCE are indeed malicious, proving that our tool can
achieve very high true positive rate with accurate analysis details.

False positive For our second goal, we analyzed our benign sample set using JSF ORCE and
then observed whether any of the samples could be incorrectly labeled as malicious. As shown in
the second row of Table 3.2, the JSF ORCE tags 9 out of 47,592 samples as malicious. We first
manually confirmed that all 9 samples are clean and thereupon study why the false positives
happen. It has been verified by manual inspection that all of the false positives are caused by the
inaccurate detection policy, to be more specific, the over-relaxation of the shellcode string
matching policy enforced by jsunpack. The reason why our tool could detect them as malicious is
that it explores JavaScript code in a more complete fashion in consequence of our forced
execution technique. Therefore, based upon the above experimental results, we argue that using
JSF ORCE will keep a very low false positive rate for JavaScript code analysis, and is able to assist
in accomplishing more thorough results. Theoretically, JSF ORCE can generate higher code
coverage than jsunpack and lead to better analysis results. But, the question is by how much.
With that, we conducted another set of experiments to show the effectiveness of JSF ORCE.
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without
JSF ORCE
Old HTML
66,325 193
New HTML
106,018 2,250
HTML Total 172,995 2,443
Old PDF
22,081 6,306
New PDF
1,428
32
PDF Total
23,509 6,338
Sample Set

Total

with
JSF ORCE
357
20,649
21,006
6,475
170
6,645

Improvement
84.9%
817.3%
759.8%
2.7%
431.2%
4.8%

Detected
By Both
193
2250
2443
6306
32
6338

Missed
With JSF ORCE
0
0
0
0
0
0

Table 3.3: Effectiveness Results.

3.5.3

Effectiveness

For the evaluation of effectiveness, we would like to demonstrate that JSF ORCE can indeed
help the malicious JavaScript code analysis by performing efficient forced execution. In order to
achieve that, we utilize our malicious HTML and PDF sample sets and run the sample sets against
jsunpack both with or without JSF ORCE for the evaluation. In the interest of showing how useful
our faked object retyping is, we also conduct another experiment that disables the retyping and
only keeps the reference error recovery component and path exploration component.

Experimental Results Table 5.2 illustrates the experimental results for effectiveness. It
demonstrates that JSF ORCE could greatly improve the detection rate for JavaScript analysis. We
can see detection rate improvements of 759.84% and 4.84% for HTML and PDF samples,
respectively, when using JSF ORCE-extended jsunpack instead of the original version for analysis.
And all the samples detected by original jsunpack are also flagged by JSF ORCE-extended
jsunpack. We further break down the numbers into old and new sample sets and perceive that the
extended version could perform much better than original jsunpack in analyzing new samples.
For new HTML samples, jsunpack with JSF ORCE is able to detect 817.3% more samples while
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Fig. 3.6.: Num of Path Exploration during Analysis.

for old samples, the number is 84.97%. Similar results are also observed for PDF samples. After
manual inspection, we confirmed that this is because many of the old samples have been analyzed
for quite sometime and jsunpack already has the signatures stored in its database, leaving only a
small margin for JSF ORCE to improve upon. For the faked object retyping evaluation, we reran
the test using 106,018 new HTML malicious samples with retyping component disabled. The
result shows that only 8,677 samples can be detected by JSF ORCE in contrast to 20,649 with
retyping enabled. This result reveals the usefulness of our faked object retyping component
during analysis. Nevertheless, through our experiments, we are able to draw the conclusion that
JSF ORCE is quite effective for boosting the effectiveness of JavaScript analysis.
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Fig. 3.7.: Runtime for Detected HTML samples.

Fig. 3.8.: Runtime for Undetected HTML samples.

Number of Paths Explored Potentially, there may be a large number of paths that exist inside
of a single JavaScript program. The effectiveness and efficiency of JSF ORCE are closely related
to the number of paths explored during analysis. Hence, we would like to show some statistics on
the number of paths that JSF ORCE explored during analysis.
The result depicted in Figure 3.6 shows that JSF ORCE is able to detect the maliciousness of
samples with a limited number of path explorations. An interesting observation is that over 96%
of the samples were detected by exploring only a single path. Even though most of the analysis
for detected samples can be finished by exploring just one path, the path exploration of JSF ORCE
is still essential. Note that 98% of the samples missed by the default jsunpack, but detected by the
JSF ORCE-extended version, explore at least two paths. So, the analysis could still receive an
enormous benefit from JSF ORCE in terms of path exploration. Please refer to the Section 6 Case
Study for more details on this topic. As for any undetected samples, JSF ORCE will explore the
entire code space during analysis, which requires a larger amount of path exploration and longer
analysis runtime.
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Fig. 3.9.: Runtime for Detected PDF samples. Fig. 3.10.: Runtime for Undetected PDF samples.

3.5.4

Runtime Performance

In this section, we evaluate the runtime performance of JSF ORCE by using our malicious and
benign datasets with a comparison between the original jsunpack and the JSF ORCE-extended
version.

Runtime for Detected Samples In this section, we compare the runtime performance using the
HTML and PDF samples that can be detected by jsunpack both with and without JSF ORCE. The
reason why we chose this sample set is that we wished to observe whether the JSF ORCE-extended
version can achieve efficiency comparable to the original jsunpack when using a detectable
malicious sample. The results are displayed in Figures 3.7 and 3.9. The results conclude that
JSF ORCE-extended version has better runtime performance than jsunpack for over 90.9% of
HTML and 83.6% of PDF samples. This conclusion is quite surprising as the JSF ORCE-extended
version tends to explore multiple paths while jsunpack only probes for one.
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AnalysisSystem
Nozzle
Zozzle

SampleSet
Offline
Online
Online

Conf. w/o
Rozzle
1,662
74
2,735

Conf. With
Rozzle
11,559
224
2,660

DetectedBy
BothConf
1,178
50
2,510

MissedBy
Rozzle-extendedConf.
484(29%)
24(32%)
225(8%)

Table 3.4: Detection Results With/Without Rozzle-extended Configuration

In theory, jsunpack should have better runtime performance. However, after investigation, we
found that many of the JavaScript samples require specific system configurations (such as specific
browser kernel version) to run. As a result, when jsunpack performs analysis, it will run the
JavaScript programs under multiple settings. This results in multiple executions, which take
additional time to complete. In contrast, the JSF ORCE-extended version handled this issue with
forced execution, resulting in better runtime performance in practice.

Runtime for Undetected Samples Figures 3.8 and 3.10 show the runtime performance of
JSF ORCE for undetected samples. We empirically set the time limit to be 300 seconds in
consequence of the fact that experiment shows almost all (99.6%) HTML and PDF samples can
be analyzed within 300 seconds. As demonstrated in the figures, the average analysis runtime for
HTML and PDF samples are 12.02 and 8.15 seconds, while the analysis for a majority (80%) of
HTML samples and PDF samples are finished within 8.54 and 7.4 seconds, respectively. When
compared with the original jsunpack, the JSF ORCE-extended version achieves an average runtime
of 16.08 seconds and 7.97 seconds for undetected HTML and PDF samples while jsunpack
finishes execution in 1.13 seconds and 1.37 seconds, correspondingly. Our conclusion from these
experiments are that the performance overhead of JSF ORCE is quite reasonable and can certainly
meet the requirements of large scale JavaScript analysis.
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3.5.5

JSF ORCE vs. Rozzle

Ideally, we would like to perform a head-to-head comparison between JSF ORCE and Rozzle
using the same dataset. Unfortunately, it is impossible given that neither the Rozzle system nor
the dataset used by Rozzle is available for evaluation. It is also nontrivial to implement Rozzle by
ourselves. Nevertheless, we can still highlight several advantages of JSF ORCE over Rozzle, from
the experimental results reported in that paper.
First, while Rozzle-extended analysis system does, JSF ORCE-extended analysis system does
not miss samples detected by the original analysis system. Table 3.4 summarizes the detection
results presented in Rozzle paper. Using Rozzle, the experiments extend two malicious JavaScript
detection systems - Nozzle [10] and Zozzle [11], and then compare the detection results with the
original system using one offline sample set and one online sample set. For the offline
experiment, with Rozzle, Nozzle can detect 11,559 samples and gains a significant
improvement(11,559 vs. 1,662) over original Nozzle. But it misses 484 (29%) samples which can
be detected by original Nozzle. For online experiments, Rozzle-extended configuration also
misses 24 (32%) for Nozzle, 225 (8%) for Zozzle respectively. Rozzle paper argues this is
because that the runtime errors, introduced when infeasible paths are executed, terminates the
execution before the malicious behaviors are exposed. However, since JSF ORCE only collects the
path information and no changes are made on the path when the sample is first executed, no
runtime errors are introduced by JSF ORCE. Thus as demonstrated in Section 3.5.3,
JSF ORCE-extended analysis system can detect all the samples identified by original analysis
system while providing the same magnitude improvement as Rozzle’s.
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Second, JSF ORCE can still function even when the environment setup is incomplete, thanks to
the forced execution model (Section 3.3.1), whereas Rozzle may fail due to the runtime errors.
This is especially important for low-interaction honey clients like jsunpack. Those
low-interaction honey clients emulate the behaviors of browsers or PDF readers, and it is quite
challenging to construct a complete environment setup for the tested samples. As discussed in
Section 3.6, of the malicious samples missed by jsunpack, 96.5% are because of the runtime
errors caused by incomplete emulation of the running environments for JavaScript code. Since
low-interaction honey clients are widely deployed in industry, we argue that JSF ORCE would
benefit the industry more than Rozzle.
Third, as discussed in the limitation part of Rozzle paper, Rozzle is less effective for the case
that the evasive code triggers the malware execution only when a user interaction occurs, or when
a timer fires. We searched the samples missed by jsunpack with the keywords like “onclick” or
“settimeout”. we found that 80.6% of them deploy timers or user interaction callbacks.
JSF ORCE’s path exploration algorithm discovers the callback functions during the execution, and
invokes them after the current run terminates. However, Rozzle may miss the malicious code
hidden in callback functions.
Fourth, Rozzle cannot handle latest fingerprinting techniques discussed in Section 3.2. While
we have not found samples deploying these techniques in our dataset, we believe that the attacker
will deploy those new fingerprinting techniques with the advancement of anti-evasion techniques
in the future. So JSF ORCE is one step ahead of the attacker.
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t r y {++( document [ ” body ” ] ) ;

window . a d d E v e n t ( ’ l o a d ’ ,

} c a t c h ( e ) {[ s h e l l c o d e ]}

f u n c t i o n ( ) {[ s h e l l c o d e ] } )

[a]

[b]

f u n c t i o n frmAdd ( ) {
v a r i f r m = document . c r e a t e E l e m e n t ( ’ i f r a m e ’ ) ;
v a r se show newupdates = new Hash . C o o k i e ( ’
ifrm . s t y l e . posi tion = ’ absolute ’ ;

se show newupdates ’ , { d u r a t i o n : 3600}) ;

document . body . a p p e n d C h i l d ( i f r m ) ; } ;

[d]

frmAdd ( ) ;

[c]
gapi . load ( ” gapi . iframes ” , function ( ) { [ . . . ] } ) ;

[e]
Fig. 3.11.: Case Study Samples

3.6

Case Study

To better understand the benefits of JSF ORCE, we conducted a case study on 10,975 unique
JavaScript code samples missed by jsunpack but detected by JSF ORCE-extended version. The
reasons of failed detection using jsunpack can be divided into the following two categories.

Malicious code branch is not triggered Of those 10,975 samples missed by jsunpack, we
found that 10,792 (98.33%) samples are explored by at least two paths when using JSF ORCE.
Although jsunpack attempts to run the sample several times with different configurations to
increase the chance of triggering the malicious code branch, it is usually ineffective to do so. This
is because it is impossible to emulate every single combination of browser/PDFReader/plugin. In
contrast, JSF ORCE can explore these paths regardless of the configuration.
The sample in Figure 3.11(a) hides malicious code within a catch block. The attacker
attempts to increase the value document[body] as a number, which will raise an exception
when executed within a real browser. However, it does not raise an exception in jsunpack since its
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SpiderMonkey engine returns NaN for this operation. In fact, the V8 engine used in JSF ORCE
also exhibits the same behavior as SpiderMonkey. But, the catch block is triggered by the path
exploration process, so the malicious behavior is still revealed.
Other samples hide code within event callbacks. For instance, the sample in Figure 3.11(b)
registers a callback function using the window.addEvent function. jsunpack fails to invoke
the callback function due to the incorrect definition of window.addEvent used by jsunpack.
At runtime, JSF ORCE identifies window.addEvent as a callback registration function because
an anonymous function is passed to it as the parameter. Then, this anonymous function is queued
and invoked at the end of execution.

Execution fails due to runtime errors Another reason why jsunpack may fail to detect
malicious JavaScript code is that the execution can fail due to runtime errors. As we conducted
the evaluation, only 230 out of the 10,975 samples could be executed without any runtime errors
under the six configurations. Moreover, 10,592 out of 10,975 (96.5%) failed all six
configurations, rendering jsunpack completely useless when facing them. These exceptions
terminate the execution before the malicious code is executed. The raised exceptions are because
of the inaccurate emulation of the running environment for JavaScript code. Examining these
exceptions can help security researchers improve jsunpack by supplying more precise emulation
environment, which is another benefit that JSF ORCE can provide.
One interesting thing about jsunpack is that it tries to fix ReferrenceError by providing a
definition for this undefined object once ReferrenceError is captured. While this fix
eliminates the ReferrenceError, it often introduces SyntaxError or TypeError at runtime.
ifrm.style is not defined in the sample in Figure 3.11(c). So jsunpack generates code var
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ifrm.style = 1 for this sample. Unfortunately, it contains an unexpected token dot. This
raises a SyntaxError exception. Another way to improve this is to assign ifrm.style an
Object so that SyntaxError is avoided and ifrm.style can be typed following the typing
rules of the JavaScript engine. However, as discussed in Section 3.3.1, this can still cause an
exception or lead to unnecessary loss of precision. This case demonstrates the advantage of type
inference model deployed by JSF ORCE. Although JSF ORCE cannot tolerate SyntaxError, the
type inference model guarantees no further TypeError or SyntaxError will be introduced.
The sample in Figure 3.11(d) raises a TypeError exception since Hash.Cookie is not a
constructor. Another sample in Figure 3.11(e) also raises a TypeError exception because
gapi.load is not a function. JSF ORCE can avoid this by applying faked object retyping
technique. From another perspective, these two cases manifest the weakness of jsunpack that
Hash.Cookie and gapi.load are not correctly defined. Therefore, as another application,
JSF ORCE can be used to evaluate the weakness of dynamic JavaScript analysis systems, so
security researchers can further improve the systems respectively.
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4. SEMANTICS-PRESERVING DISSECTION OF JAVASCRIPT
EXPLOITS VIA DYNAMIC JS-BINARY ANALYSIS
4.1

Introduction

Previously unknown, or “zero-day”, exploits are of particular interest to the security
community. Once a malicious JavaScript attack is captured, it must be analyzed and its
inner-workings understood quickly so that proper defenses can be deployed to protect against it or
similar attacks in the future. Unfortunately, this analysis process is tedious, painstaking, and
time-consuming. From the analysis perspective, an analyst seeks to answer two key questions:
(1) Which JavaScript statements uniquely characterize the exploit? and (2) Where is the payload
located within the exploit? The answer to the first question results in the generation of an exploit
signature, which can then be deployed via an intrusion detection system (IDS) to discover and
prevent the exploit. The answer to the second question allows an analyst to replace the malicious
payload with an amicable payload and use the modified exploit as a proof-of-vulnerability (PoV)
to perform penetration testing.
Program slicing [77] is a key technique in exploit analysis. This technique begins with a
source location of interest, known as slicing source, such as a statement or instruction that causes
a crash, and identifies any statements or instructions that this source location depends on. Prior
exploit analysis solutions have attempted to analyze exploits at either the JavaScript
level [5, 9–11, 19, 20] or the underlying binary level [21–25].
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While binary level solutions execute an exploit and analyze the underlying binary execution
for anomalies, they are unaware of any JavaScript level semantics and fail to present the
JavaScript level view of the exploit. JavaScript level analysis fails to account for implicit data
flows between statements because any DOM/BOM APIs invoked at the binary level are invisible
at the JavaScript level. Unfortunately, implicit flows are quite common in attacks and are often
comprised of seemingly random and irregular operations in the JavaScript that achieve a precise
precondition or a specific trigger which exploits a vulnerability in the binary. The semantic gap
between JavaScript level and binary level during the analysis makes it challenging to
automatically answer the 2 key questions.
In this chapter, I present JS CALPEL, a system that creatively combines JavaScript and binary
level analyses to analyze exploits. It stems from the observation that seemingly complex and
irregular JavaScript statements in an exploit often exhibit strong data dependencies in the binary.
JS CALPEL utilizes the JavaScript context information from the JavaScript level to perform
context-aware binary analysis. Further, it leverages binary analysis to account for implicit
JavaScript level dependencies arising due to side effects at the binary level. In essence, it performs
JavaScript and binary, or JS-Binary analysis. Given a functional JavaScript exploit, JS CALPEL
performs JS-Binary analysis to: (1) generate a minimized exploit script, which in turn helps to
generate a signature for the exploit, and (2) precisely locate the payload within the exploit. It
replaces the malicious payload with a friendly payload and generates a PoV for the exploit.
I evaluated JS CALPEL on a corpus of 15 exploits, 9 from Metasploit1 , 4 exploits from 3
different exploit kits and 2 wild exploits. On average, I was able to reduce the number of unique
JavaScript statements by 49.8%, and precisely identify the payload, in a semantics-preserving
1

Metasploit Framework – http://www.metasploit.com/, a popular penetration testing framework.
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manner, meaning that the minimized exploits are still functional. In addition, we were able to
replace the payload with amicable payload to perform penetration testing. Finally, I presented the
wild exploit CVE-2011-1255 as a case study. I demonstrate how the exploit is minimized and
payload is located.

4.2

Problem Statement and Overview

4.2.1

Problem Statement

We aim to develop JS CALPEL– a framework to combine JavaScript and binary analyses to aid
in analysis of JavaScript-launched memory corruption exploits. It is motivated by two key
observations.
First, analysis performed at only the JavaScript level is insufficient. In Figure 2.3(b),
JavaScript level analysis of Aurora captures the explicit data dependencies between statements 9
and 26 and statements 6 and 18. However, because no explicit dependency exists between
statements 18 and 26, the two groups of statements will be incorrectly deemed to be independent
of each other. Second, while complete, analysis performed at only the binary level is also
insufficient. In Figure 2.3(d), binary level analysis can expose the manipulation of pointers,
however it can not expose exploit-related JavaScript statements in Figure 2.3 (c) due to the lack of
JavaScript context. A binary-level analysis will show the memory written by the binary
instructions of statement 18 is utilized through reads performed by binary instructions of
statement 26, revealing a straight-forward data dependency between statements 18 and 26.
Input: JS CALPEL accepts a raw functional exploit and a vulnerable program as input. The
vulnerable program can be any program like (PDF reader, web browser, etc.) as long as it can be
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Fig. 4.1.: Architecture of JS CALPEL

exploited through JavaScript. The exploit consists of HTML and malicious JavaScript
components. The exploit can be obfuscated or encrypted. JS CALPEL makes no assumptions about
the nature of payloads. That is, the payload could be ROP-only, executable-only or combined.
Output: JS CALPEL performs JS-Binary tracing and slicing and generates 3 specific outputs. (1)
A simplified exploit HTML that contains the key JavaScript statements that are required to
accomplish the exploit, and (2) the precise JavaScript statements that inject the payload into the
vulnerable process’ memory along with the exact payload string – both non-executable and
executable – within the JavaScript. Finally, (3) an HTML page, where the malicious payload is
replaced by a benign payload is generated as a Proof-of-Vulnerability (PoV).
Delta debugging [78] is firstly proposed to generate the minimized C programs that crash the
compiler and might be a feasible approach to minimize the exploit JavaScript to cause a crash.
However, the effectiveness of this approach is unknown, because of the complex and sophisticated
nature of JavaScript. Attackers can insert arbitrary junk code to make delta debugging ineffective.
In contrast, JS CALPEL can precisely pinpoint the JavaScript statements that cause a crash and
locate the malicious payload and our experiment has proven its effectiveness.
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4.2.2

JS CALPEL– Overview

Figure 4.1 presents the architecture of JS CALPEL, which leverages Virtual Machine Monitor
(VMM) based analysis. It consists of multiple components. A multi-level tracer is used to gather
JavaScript and binary traces. A CFI module is used to determine the binary level “slicing
sources”, which are the violations that cause the exploit along with the various payload
components. The multi-level slicer augments JavaScript level slicing with information from
binary level slicing to obtain the relevant exploit and payload statements. Finally, JS CALPEL
packages the relevant exploit statements within an HTML page to generate the minimized script.
It also replaces the malicious payload with a benign payload to generate a PoV.

4.3

Multi-level Tracing and Slicing-Source Identification

We implement JS CALPEL on top of DECAF [79], a whole-system dynamic analysis
framework. The tracing consists of two parts, JavaScript and binary tracers. JavaScript tracing is
performed using a helper module that is injected into the browser address space. It interacts with
the JavaScript debug interface within the browser to gather the JavaScript-level trace. The binary
tracer and the exploit detection module are implemented as 2 plugins of DECAF. Below, we
detail each of the components.

4.3.1

Context-Aware Multi-Level Tracing

JavaScript Tracer Prior approaches that gather JavaScript trace [5, 6] modify JavaScript
engine or the browser to identify the precise statements being executed, however such an
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Fig. 4.2.: Multi-level analysis of Aurora Exploit. Fig. 4.3.:
Slicing.

Semantics-Preserving Multi-level

approach requires access to JavaScript engine (and/or browser) source code which is not available
for close sourced browsers like IE.
We take a JavaScript debugger-based approach. Our approach has two key advantages. (1)
Most browsers – open-sourced or otherwise – support a debugging interface to debug the
JavaScript statements being executed, and (2) Because the debugger runs within the browser
context, it readily provides the JavaScript-level semantics. That is, we can not only gather the
exact statements being executed, but also retrieve the values of variables and arguments at various
statements. From within the VMM, we hook the JavaScript debugger at specific APIs to retrieve
the various JavaScript statements and the corresponding contexts. The accumulation of the
JavaScript statements yields the JavaScript trace.
JavaScript tracer runs as an injected module within Internet Explorer. It implements the
“active script debugger” [80] interface and performs three specific actions:
1) Establish Context: Through the script-debugger interface, the tracer is notified when
execution reaches JavaScript code. Specifically, if a SCRIPT tag is encountered within an
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existing script or the script generated through eval statement, the tracer is activated with
the information regarding the statement being executed. Until the next statement executes,
the tracer associates the context to the current JavaScript statement.
2) Record Trace: At the beginning of every JavaScript statement, the tracer records the exact
statement semantics along with the variable values and arguments to APIs (if any).
3) Drive Binary Tracer: A stub function is defined to coordinate the JavaScript tracer and the
binary tracer. Before the statement executes, the binary tracer is activated along with the
context information passed as the arguments of stub function such that the binary trace is
associated with the particular JavaScript statement.

Binary Tracer Binary tracer is triggered by the JavaScript tracer with the context information
pertaining to a particular JavaScript statement. One way to gather a binary trace would be to
monitor and capture the entire execution of the browser process at an instruction level. However,
such a solution is resource intensive and inefficient. In order to be practical, our solution is
selective about what is traced and when it is traced. Our goals towards an effective binary trace
are to: (1) include all the relevant binary instructions that contribute to the attack, and (2)
minimize the trace footprint as much as possible.
Firstly, since binary tracer is driven by JavaScript tracer, it has the precise JavaScript context.
Tracing is limited and selectively turned on only when the execution is in a JavaScript statement.
It is likely that the multithreading of the browser will introduce unrelated execution trace. But it
does not jeopardize the analysis since all the binary instructions that contribute to the attack are
included. Secondly, the effects of statements at a JavaScript-level manifest as memory reads and
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writes at a binary-level. Therefore, we implement a lightweight tracing mechanism. Instead of
logging every binary instruction, we only log the memory read or write operations. We leverage
memory IO specific callbacks supported by DECAF to record the values of eip, memory address,
memory size, value in the memory and esp for each memory IO instruction. We also record the
addresses of basic blocks that are executed and dump their raw bytes from virtual memory space
of the monitored process at the end of every JavaScript statement. Furthermore, the binary tracer
maintains information about active allocations made by the victim process. This information is
used to identify self-modifying (or JIT) code. When such code is encountered, the code is
dumped to the disk. When needed, the raw bytes are decoded to retrieve the actual instructions.
The propagation of the slicing sources between registers and memory is identified by the memory
IO logs and the binary instruction logic. While preserving the completed information as full
instruction trace does for slicing process, this lightweight trace minimizes the trace size and also
speeds up the slicing process.
Binary tracer is implemented as a plugin to DECAF. In the plugin, the stub function of
JavaScript tracer is hooked to coordinate the binary tracing and JavaScript tracing. When the stub
function is invoked by JavaScript tracer, the Binary tracer first reads the parameters of stub
function from the stack where JavaScript Tracer passes the JavaScript statement and debugger
information, then starts the logging of binary trace and generates a combined JS-Binary trace
which contains the JavaScript and binary traces for each of the JavaScript statements. Meanwhile,
a JS-binary map is built to keep track of corresponding JavaScript statement for every binary
instruction.
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Fig. 4.4.: Non-executable (ROP) and executable payloads used in an exploit.

Obfuscation and Encryption Resistance The nature of JavaScript tracing provides inherent
resistance to obfuscation and encryption because it captures each statement that is executed along
with the runtime information like variable values, arguments, etc. Therefore, the intermediate
statements (like the ones in Figure 2.3(a)) that are used to calculate a value are each captured with
their concrete values. Similarly, encrypted statements must be decrypted before they are executed,
and the decrypted statements execute. Therefore, JS CALPEL encounters and records the
decrypted statements that execute.
In fact, JS CALPEL performs preliminary preprocessing by performing constant folding with
the help of the script execution trace. This simple optimization will not cause over simplification
and generates a functionally equivalent de-obfuscated and decrypted version of the script. Then
JS CALPEL executes the de-obfuscated version to perform the analysis. This preprocessing
reduces the amount of analyzed JavaScript statements.

4.3.2

Identifying Slicing Sources

JS CALPEL makes use of a CFI module to identify slicing sources. Several solutions have been
proposed to implement CFI [81]. Since JS CALPEL already relies on a VMM for trace gathering,
it can leverage a VMM based CFI defense. We opt the techniques presented in Total-CFI [25]
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because (1) it is a recent and practical solution, (2) it has been demonstrated to work on recent
real-world exploits and finally (3) it imposes low overhead. It monitors the program execution at
an instruction level and each point where the CFI is violated is noted as a slicing source. Albeit
the recent advancement of exploitation techniques [82] can bypass the coarse-grained CFI
techniques like Total-CFI, JS CALPEL’s CFI module can be enhanced to include more policies to
adapt the development of exploitation techniques.
Specifically, the first violation is the slicing source for the exploit-related code, whereas the
subsequent violations (if any) arise from the executable payload or ROP-payload. In Figure 4.4,
the first violation is caused by the exploiting code, then the violations that occur up to the
execution of executable payload serve as sources for ROP-payload. Moreover, the CFI module
continues execution to check for executable payloads. If after the first violation, the execution
ever reaches a region that within the list of allocated regions, the address is noted and it serves as
the binary slicing source for the executable payload.

4.4

Multi-level Slicing

Multi-level slicing employed by JS CALPEL is based on the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis Implicit data dependencies at JavaScript level often manifest as direct data
dependencies at binary level.
Memory corruption exploits typically corrupt the memory by causing precise memory writes
to key locations that are read by the program and result in corruption of program counter. Chen et
al., show that a common characteristic of many classes of vulnerabilities is pointer
taintedness [48], where a pointer is said to be tainted if the attacker input can directly or indirectly
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Algorithm 2 Binary level backward slicer
continue
Input: binray trace B,slicing source S and JS- 11:
12:
end if
Binary map M and JavaScript trace list J
13:
end if
Output: JavaScript slice O
14:
if getDestOperand(bik ) ∈ S then
1: S ← {slicing source
15:
S ← S ∪ updateSlice(exploit point or payload location)}
Source(bik , S)
2: O ← ∅
16:
L ← L ∪ {bik }
3: for i = len(J); i > 0; i + + do
17:
end if
4:
Bi ← getBin18:
end for
InsT raceF orJS(M, J[i], B)
19:
if L! = ∅ then
5:
for k = len(Bi ); k > 0; k + + do
20:
O ← O ∪ {J[i]}
6:
bik ← Bi [k]
21:
L←∅
7:
L←∅
22:
end if
8:
if S is all memory locations then
23: end for
9:
Mw ←GetM emW riteRec(bik )
10:
if S ∩ Mw == ∅ then

reach the program counter. In essence taint propagation reflects runtime data-flow within the
program. Therefore, at a binary level, memory corruption exploits such as use-after-free, heap
overflow, buffer overflow, etc. often exhibit simple data-flow, which can be captured through
data-dependency analysis.
Figure 4.3 presents the overview of slicing employed by JS CALPEL. In order for the
simplified exploit to be functional, it is necessary that the simplification preserves the semantics
between the original and simplified scripts. Given the slicing sources and the JS-binary trace,
JS CALPEL first performs a binary backward slice from the slice source provided by CFI violation
and generates sources for JavaScript-level slicing. Slicing at the binary level ensures that no
required statement is missed. Then, slicing is performed at a JavaScript level to include all the
statements that sources are either data- or control-dependent on.
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4.4.1

Binary-level Slicing

The goal of binary slicing is to identify all the JavaScript statements that are instrumental in
coercing the control flow (i.e., statements that modify the program counter) or injecting the
payload into memory.
Algorithm 2 describes the backward slicing method using the lightweight binary trace. For
every JavaScript statement J[i], the corresponding binary instruction trace Bi is extracted. A map
called “JS-Binary map” M – a mapping between the JavaScript statements and the binary
instructions that execute within the statement context – is used. Then for every binary instruction
bik ∈ Bi , if all of the elements in the slicing source S belong to memory locations, then the slicer
checks if the current binary instruction bik has memory write operations Mw ⊆ S and if it is false,
the slicer jumps to the next instruction bi(k+1) . Otherwise, the slicer does as traditional slicer to
disassemble the binary instruction bik and updates the slicing source S and determine if bik should
be added in the binary slice L based on the propagation rules for every x86 instruction. If L is not
empty when the slicing on Bi is finished, J[i] is added to the JavaScript slice O as the hidden
dependency slice which may be ignored by pure JavaScript-level slicing.
In theory, a binary backward slice from the slicing sources must include all the JavaScript
statements that are pertinent to the attack. However, in practice we found a key problem with such
an approach. It is too permissive and ends up including all the JavaScript statements in the script.
The main reason is the binary-level amalgamation of JavaScript and browser code along with
JavaScript code. In order to track the exploit-specific information-flow, the flow through pointers
must be considered. However, at a binary level, due to the complex nature of a JavaScript engine,
dependencies are propagated to all the statements thereby leading to dependency explosion.

62
We exclude data propagation arising from code corresponding to the script engine and debug
interface. Particularly, we apply the following filters to minimize the dependency explosion
problem.

Stack Filtering Once the dependency propagates to stack pointer esp or stack frame ebp, all
data on the stack becomes dependent [83]. To avoid this, dependencies arising due to esp or ebp
are removed during slicing. In certain cases, the stack data could be marked dependent, but when
the callee returns, the dependency is discarded if it exists on a stack variable. So JS CALPEL
records the current stack pointer for every read/write, and during backward slicing, when call
instruction is encountered in the trace, the slicer checks the current stack pointer and clears the
dependencies propagating from the callee’s stack.

Module Filtering During the slicing process, the propagation to or from the JavaScript engine
module or script debugger is stopped. In principle, every Javascript statement executed by the
same Javascript engine instance shares the data and control dependency introduced by the
Javascript engine and debugger module. This kind of dependency is outside of “exploit specific”
dependency and should be excluded from slicing.

Other Filters Between two consecutive JavaScript statements, we found that sometimes there
are data flows via CPU registers because of the deep call stack incurred by JavaScript engine and
script debugger. To avoid unintended dependencies, the slicer clears the register sinks at the end
of the slicing for every JavaScript statement. During our experiments (Section 4.5), we found the
above filters good enough to reduce the dependency-explosion problem without missing any
required statements.
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4.4.2

JavaScript Slicing

The output of binary tracer provides the slicing sources for the JavaScript slicer. Suppose
binary slice S contains n instructions. For each instruction Si , let Ji be the JavaScript statement
that represents the context under which Si executes. Then, the JavaScript slicing sources are
O = ⋃ni=0 Ji . For every JavaScript statement in the slicing sources, we add the object used by this
JavaScript statement to the slicing sources and include this JavaScript statement in the slice.
Given the JavaScript trace, the slicer uses WALA’s [84] slicing algorithm to include all the related
JavaScript statement in the slice.

4.4.3

Minimized Exploit Script and PoV Generation

The statements are first simplified and then embedded into the exploit HTML page to obtain
the minimized exploit. Also, the identified executable payload is replaced by an amicable payload
to obtain a PoV in the form of a test case for the Metasploit framework.

Simplification As a final step, JS CALPEL performs constant folding and dead-code elimination
at JavaScript level to simplify the slice. It is focused on strings and constants. Specifically, for
each variable v, the definitions are propagated to the uses. This is repeated for all the variables in
all the statements until no more propagations are possible. Finally, if a definition of a variable
has no more uses, the definition is considered dead-code and is removed only if the statement is
not a source for the JavaScript slicing. This distinction is important because, the need for slice
sources is already established from binary slicing. The resulting processed script is used to
exploit the browser and is accepted only if the exploitation succeeds. Finally, all the statements in
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Fig. 4.5.: CVE-2012-1876: ROP- and executable-payloads within the same string.

the script that are not a part of the slice are removed. During our experiments, we found that the
simplicity of simplification incorporated by JS CALPEL is sufficient to bring about significant
reduction in the sizes of the scripts as highlighted in Section 4.5.

Collocated ROP and Executable Payloads

In some exploits, the payload and the ROP-gadgets

are contained within the same string or array. For example in Figure 4.5 the same string contains
both ROP-payload and the executable shellcode. In such cases, JS-Binary analysis identifies the
statement as both exploit and payload statement. This is an expected behavior. However, in order
to replace the payload to generate the PoV, we must precisely identify the location of the start of
the payload within the string. First, the JavaScript string that contains the payload is located in the
memory. Then, from the payload-slice source we obtain the address of the entry point of the
payload. Binary slicing from the payload-slice source leads us to the offset within the JavaScript
string that corresponds to the payload. The substring beginning from the offset is replaced for
PoV generation.

ROP-Only Payload Shacham [85] showed that a set of Turing complete gadgets can be created
using program text of libc. Though we cannot find any instances of ROP-only payload during our
experiments, it is possible to compose the entire payload using only ROP-gadgets without any
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executable payload. Since JS CALPEL can locate the ROP-only payload precisely, a
straightforward way is to replace malicious ROP-only payload with benign ROP-only payload.
JS CALPEL can generate dependent JavaScript statements in the script for any given
binary-level source and the JS-Binary trace. Along with the exploit point and the payload entry
point, CFI component of JS CALPEL captures multiple violations caused due to the ROP-gadget
chain as separate binary-level slicing sources. The sources are then subject to multi-level tracing
the slicing to extract the payload in JavaScript.

Disjoint Payload Detecting the entry point of executable payload is sufficient to replace the
payload and generate the PoV. However, sometimes an analyst may want to locate the entire
executable payload. This is not a problem if the payload is allocated by the same string in the
JavaScript. However, it is not necessary to be so.
JS CALPEL can only detect an executable payload when it executes. Therefore, it is unaware
of all the various fragments of payload that may be injected into the memory. As a result,
JS CALPEL will only be able to detect the JavaScript statement (and all its dependencies) that
injects the entry point of the payload. It may miss some JavaScript statements that inject
non-entry point payload if such statements are disjoint with the JavaScript statements that inject
the entry point, and the sources for those statements are missing. Note that this is not quite a
limitation for JS CALPEL, because the payload entry point is sufficient to generate a PoV. One way
to increase the amount of payload recovered is for the CFI module to allow the payload to execute
longer and capture more binary-level sources for the payload.
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4.5

Evaluation

We evaluate JS CALPEL on a corpus of 15 exploits. These samples exploit the vulnerabilities
discovered from 2009 to 2013 and target at Internet Explorer 6/7/8. In contrast to the large
number of browser vulnerabilities discovered every year, this sample set is relatively old and
small. The reasons are twofold. First, DECAF leveraged by JS CALPEL is based on emulator
QEMU and only supports 32-bit operating system. Not all of the exploits can function correctly
on DECAF. Second, it is difficult to collect working exploits although many vulnerabilities are
discovered every year. We went over Internet Explorer related exploits in Metasploit, and tried to
set up a working environment for each of them. We were able to set up 15 exploits on the real
hardware. The remaining exploits either require specific browser/plugin versions that we were
unable to find, or do not use JavaScript to launch the attacks. We then tested these 15 exploits on
DECAF and 9 of them worked correctly. The 6 exploits failed to work on DECAF, because they
exhibited heavy heap spray behavior, which could not finish within a reasonable amount of time
in DECAF. Based on a whole-system emulator QEMU, DECAF translates a virtual memory
address into its corresponding physical address completely in software implementation, and thus
is much slower than the MMU (Memory Management Unit) in a real CPU. In the future, we will
replace DECAF with Pin to avoid this expensive memory address translation overhead. We also
crawled the Virustotal with the keyword “exploit type:html”, and finally found 2 functional
exploits on DECAF. In addition, from 16 exploit kits used in EkHunter[86], we managed to get 4
functional exploits from exploitkit, Siberia and Crimepack. As a result, our testset includes 9
exploits from Metasploit framework, 4 exploits from 3 different exploit kits and 2 wild exploits.
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Table 4.1: Exploit Analysis Results
Source

Metasploit

Wild
exploitkit
Siberia
Crimepack

CVE
2009-0075
2010-0249
2010-0806
2010-3962
2012-1876
2012-1889
2012-4969
2013-3163
2013-3897
2011-1255
2012-1889
2010-0806
2010-0806
2010-0806
2009-0075

I
9
3
2
1
32
1
16
9
26
40
1
2
2
2
4

Exploitation
Component
II III IV
6
✓
17
6
7
19
10 ✓
10
1
✓
1
1
7
30
2
✓
2
1
7
8
1
7
13
1
7
41
1
7
16
2
✓
2
6
✓
6
6
✓
6
1
7
6
6
7
12

V
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

Payload
Injection
VI
14
10
14
15
14
67
53
32
23
26
27
13
12
11
12

Simplified Exploit
VII
30
45
803
105
67
77
117
43
187
97
53
109
103
198
36

VIII
30
22
13
17
47
77
70
42
63
44
12
29
22
30
33

IX

0.00
0.51
0.98
0.83
0.30
0.00
0.40
0.02
0.66
0.55
0.77
0.73
0.79
0.85
0.08

X

†*
‡* †
‡* †
‡* †
†*
‡†§
§
‡†H
‡†H
†*
‡†*
‡†*
‡†*

I. # of JS slicing sources.
II. # of stmts from JS analysis only.
III. Can stmts from JS-only analysis cause crash?
IV. # of stmts from JS-Bin analysis
V. Can stmts from JS-Bin analysis cause crash? VI. # of stmts from JS-Bin analysis
VII. # of unique JS stmts of original exploit. VIII. # of unique JS stmts of simplified exploit
IX. potency of minimization.
X. Obfuscation & fingerprinting Techniques.(‡: Randomization Obf. †: Data Obf. *: Encoding Obf.
§: Logic Structure Obf. H: Fingerprinting tech)

To identify the CVE number of exploits from exploit kits and wild, we ran JS CALPEL to
extract exploitation component first and then manually searched Metasploit database and National
Vulnerability Database [87] for a match. While CVE-2012-1889 exploits the vulnerability in
msxml.dll, all the remaining samples exploit mshtml.dll.
Though we evaluated JS CALPEL on Internet Explorer only, potentially it can work on other
browsers or any other programs (e.g., Adobe Reader) that have JavaScript debug interface. The
experiments were performed on a server running Ubuntu 12.04 on 32 core Intel Xeon(R) 2 GHz
CPU and 128 GB memory. The code comprises of 890 lines of Python, 2300 lines of Java and
4000 lines of C++.
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4.5.1

Minimizing Exploits

Table 4.1 presents the results for exploit analysis. Given one exploit, we first ran JS CALPEL to
get the multi-level trace and CFI violation point. Then multi-level slicing was conducted to yield
exploitation component and payload injection component. Based on this knowledge, our
experiments demonstrate that for each exploit, JS CALPEL was able to generate a simplified
exploit and PoV which were able to successfully exploit the vulnerability and launch the payload.

Exploitation Analysis The binary-level slicing was conducted on the multi-level trace starting
from the CFI violation point. It mapped binary level slicing results to JavaScript statements with
the help of JS-binary map. The number of JavaScript statements identified by binary-level
analysis is listed in Column I. They were used as the slicing sources for JavaScript level slicing.
This multi-level slicing extracted the exploitation related statements the number of which were
listed in Column IV. Column V shows if the extracted statements can crash the browser. For the
exploits with the same CVE number like CVE-2009-0075 and CVE-2010-0806, the results of
Column IV can be different due to the different implementation of exploitation. But we can see
that for all of the exploits, the extracted statements can crash the browser, meaning that the
semantics of exploitation component are preserved.
In comparison, the JavaScript-level only analysis cannot achieve this as presented in Column
II and III. Column II lists the number of JavaScript statements obtained from backward slicing
only at the JavaScript level starting from the statement that causes the first CFI violation. Column
III indicates if the statements extracted from JavaScript-level slicing can cause the browser to
crash. We can see that for 8 out of 15 exploits, the extracted statements do not cause a crash,
which means these exploits are overly simplified in these cases. For the exploits with the same
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CVE number like CVE-2010-0806 and CVE-2009-0075, the JavaScript-level only analysis
results were different, because the different obfuscation techniques used in these exploits
introduced or eliminated unexpected dependency at JavaScript level.

Payload Injection The CFI violation information provides the exact location of the payload in
memory. The multi-level slicing yields the payload injection statements of which the number is
listed in Column VI of Table 4.1. Column 3 in Table 4.2 lists the payload definition statements.
For each of the exploit, our JS-Binary analysis was able to precisely pinpoint the payload
injection statements for PoV generation. By contrast, solutions like JSGuard [8] or NOZZLE [10]
cannot do the same, because they lack the JavaScript context and can only pinpoint the payload in
the memory. Solutions by scanning the exploit code directly cannot always identify the correct
payload injection statements since the payload is often obfuscated.

Minimized Exploit For each of the exploits, we combined the payload injection statements
(Column VI) with the exploitation component (Column IV) to generate a minimized working
exploit. In the experiment, we observed that each minimized exploit was indeed functional,
meaning that it can exploit the vulnerability and launch the payload successfully. The Column VII
lists the number of unique JavaScript statements observed at the execution of the original exploit.
Column VIII lists the number of unique JavaScript statements observed in the execution of the
minimized exploit.
The minimized exploit excludes the JavaScript statements that belong to obfuscation code or
fingerprinting code. We characterize those codes in Column X of Table 4.1. They cover different
obfuscation or fingerprinting techniques. These techniques are designed to bypass the detection
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tool and make the analysis challenging. So the minimized exploit can ease the manual analysis
process by removing these JavaScript statements. To quantify the degree of code complexity
reduction in these minimized exploits, we adopt a metric called “potency of minimization” from
an existing work [88]. A minimization is potent if it makes the minimized program P ′ less
obscure ( or complex or unreadable) than the original program P . we choose the number of
unique JavaScript statements observed in the execution as the metric because it represents the
number of inspected statements by an analyst. This is formalized in the following definition:
DEFINITION (POTENCY OF MINIMIZATION) 1. Let U (P ) be the number of unique
JavaScript statements observed at the execution of P . τpot , the minimization potency with respect
to program P , is a measure of the extent to which the minimization reduces the obscurity of P . It
is defined as
)
τpot = 1 + UU(P
(P ) .
def

′

On average, the minimization potency was 0.498, which means we were able to eliminate
49.8% of statements in the trace, whereas the maximum is 0.98. The potency of minimization of
CVE-2009-0075 and CVE-2012-1889 from Metasploit are both 0, because no obfuscation
techniques are applied to them. We did observe that for the exploits from the wild and exploit
kits, the average potency of minimization (0.63) was higher than that (0.41) for the exploits from
Metasploit. This means that it is generally more difficult to analyze the real world exploits.

4.5.2

PoV Generation

PoV generation is an end result of payload analysis. By replacing the payload in the
minimized exploit with a benign one, a PoV is generated for penetration test. Column 3 in
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Table 4.2: Payload Analysis Results. All exploits provide a single JavaScript statement from the
binary perspective, which is the context in which the exploiting instruction executes.
Source

CVE
2009-0075
2010-0249
2010-0806

Metasploit

wild
exploitkit
Siberia
crimepack

2010-3962
2012-1876
2012-1889
2012-4969
2013-3163
2013-3897
2011-1255
2012-1889
2010-0806
2010-0806
2010-0806
2009-0075

Payload definition stmt
var shellcode = unescape(“%u1c35%u90a8%u3abf...”)
var LLVc = unescape(“%u1c35%u90a8%u3abf%u..”)
unescape((function(){
var wd$ =
return “%u4772%u9314%u9815...”}))
var shellcode = unescape(“%u0c74%ud513%uf...”)
for (var a3d = unescape(“%uec01%u77c4%u...”),...)
var code = unescape(“%uba92%u91b5%ub0b1...”)
var GBvB = unescape(“%uc481%uf254%uffff...”)
p += unescape(“%ub860%u77c3%ud038...”)
sprayHeap({shellcode:unescape(“%u868a%u77c3...”})
var sc = unescape(“%u9090%u9090%u9090%u1c3...”)
var mmmbc=(“Data5756Data3352Data64c9...”)
var qq = unescape(”%ucddb%u74d9%uf424%u...”)
var qq = unescape(”!5350!5251!..”.replace(...”)
var rktchpv= unescape(”%u06b8%u5c67%udae4...”)
var ysazuzbwzdqlr=unescape(”%u06b8%u5c67%u...”)

I
3024
3024

II
7
7

3072

7

3072
3072
3072
618
36696
696
3024
2880
649
1750
648
648

7
✓
7
7
✓
✓
7
7
7
7
7
7

I. Payload Length II. Collocated payload?

Table 4.2 lists the payload definition statements, where the payload content is first introduced or
defined in the JavaScript code. The definition statement is usually accompanied by other
statements required to inject the payload. Payload length (Column 4 in Table 4.2) is the size of the
payload that was identified. In one of the samples (CVE-2013-3163), the encoder was embedded
within the payload and therefore, the size of the payload was much larger than other exploits. In 3
out of 15 exploits, we found the ROP and executable payloads to be collocated within the same
string. In each exploit, the payload was replaced with a benign payload and a PoV was generated.

4.5.3

Effects of Filtering

The filters help to exclude the unexpected dependencies. In Table 4.3, we evaluated the effects
of filtering on minimizing exploits. We found that preprocessing is effective in cases where the
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Table 4.3: Effects of Filtering on Exploit Analysis.
Source

Metasploit

wild
exploitkit
Siberia
crimepack

CVE
2009-0075
2010-0249
2010-0806
2010-3962
2012-1876
2012-1889
2012-4969
2013-3163
2013-3897
2011-1255
2012-1889
2010-0806
2010-0806
2010-0806
2009-0075

Unique
# JS
stmts
30
45
803
105
67
77
117
43
187
97
53
109
103
198
36

# JS
after preprocessing
30
32
27
17
51
78
77
43
64
66
53
32
27
195
35

No
Filter

Stack
Filter

Module
Filter

All
Filters

30
32
27
16
50
78
77
41
64
66
51
31
26
194
25

14
4
13
16
41
2
16
4
26
45
1
31
26
22
5

28
32
27
16
50
77
75
41
64
66
1
31
26
194
5

9
3
2
1
32
1
16
9
26
40
1
2
2
2
4

scripts are obfuscated because, during obfuscation, multiple statements are used to accomplish
the tasks of a single statement like eval. Column 3-4 lists the number of the unique JavaScript
statements in the slicing results under different filter configurations. With no filters, we did not
find any significant reduction in the slicing results. This emphasizes the need for filtering. Stack
Filter and Module Filter individually produced varying amount of size reduction depending on the
exploit, but in general, the combination proved to be most effective. For example, for
CVE-2010-3962, the combination of all the filters reduced the number of statements to a single
statement, while none of the filters were individually effective.

4.5.4

Case Study – CVE-2011-1255

In order to highlight the advantages of JS CALPEL, we perform a study of the wild exploit,
CVE-2011-1255 [89], which exploits a “Time Element Memory Corruption Vulnerability” of the
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Timed Interactive Multimedia Extension implementation in Microsoft Internet Explorer 6 through
8. The exploit (MD5:016c280b8f1f155 80f89d058dc5102bb) targets Internet Explorer 6 on
Windows XP SP3. Given the exploit sample, JS CALPEL successfully generated the minimized
exploit code, payload injection code and penetration test template for Metasploit. We would like
to highlight that a sample for CVE-2011-1255 was previously unavailable on Metasploit DB and
JS CALPEL was able to generate one.

Simplified Exploit Statements

JS CALPEL loads the simplified page and logs the JS-Binary

trace until the CFI violation-point (detailed in Figure 4.6) is reached. The violation point 1
represents the hijacked control flow transfer from 0x7ddd44a1 to the payload location
0x0c0c0c0c through an indirect call instruction – call DWORD[ecx+0X8]. Note that the
exploit does not contain any ROP-gadgets and that the entire payload is executable. From the
violation, either ecx or [ecx + 0x8] may be manipulated by the attacker and therefore both
will have to be considered as possible slicing sources. From the memory IO log (point 2 ), the
location of [ecx+0x8] is extracted as 0x0c0c0c14. Both ecx and the memory location
0x0c0c0c14 are provided as the slicing sources for the binary-level slicer to uncover the
implicit data dependency pertaining to the exploit.
The binary level slicer identified 40 JavaScript level sources. JavaScript slicer included an
additional 64 statements to generate the simplified exploit. Using the simplified exploit, we were
able to trigger the vulnerability in IE 6.

Simplified Payload-Injection Statements and Payload Location Similar to simplifying the
exploit statements, JS CALPEL uses payload location 0x0c0c0c0c as the slicing source for

74

Fig. 4.6.: CFI Violation Point

identifying the payload-injection statements, and gathers the simplified statements. The
binary-level slicer confirmed the statement 36:

a[i] = lh.substr(0, lh.length)

as the JavaScript statement that injects payload into memory. Then, this statement was used as the
slicing source for JavaScript-level slicer. Finally, JS CALPEL identified all the payload injection
JavaScript statements.
The payload is located at 0x0c0c0c0c. Therefore, JS CALPEL extracts the page at
0x0c0c0c0c to analyze the payload. JS CALPEL first trims the padding instruction like nop
from the payload. Next, JS CALPEL compares it with the constant strings in the payload injection
JavaScript statements to identify the exact payload string. JS CALPEL identified (var sc =
unescape("%u9090%u9090%u90
90%u9090%u1c35%u90a8%u3abf%ub2d5....")) as the JavaScript statement
containing the payload. Since the entire payload is executable, JS CALPEL replaced the entire
payload to generate the Metasploit test case. We generate a Ruby template script for Metasploit
framework, and we were able to successfully test it on Internet Explorer 6 on Windows XP SP3.
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5. VULNERABILITY-AGNOSTIC DEFENSE OF JAVASCRIPT
EXPLOITS VIA MEMORY PERTURBATION
5.1

Introduction

To mitigate JavaScript exploits, software vendors have deployed many mitigation techniques
like Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), Data Execution Prevention (DEP), control
flow guard [38], sandbox [90], EMET [37], etc.. These mitigation techniques increases the bar on
exploitation. Attackers have to combine complex memory preparation, memory disclosure, code
reuse and other techniques to launch a successful exploit.
While these exploit mitigation techniques are constantly improving, hacking contests like
Pwn2Own [31], GeekPwn [32], etc., consistently demonstrate that the latest versions of Chrome,
Safari, Internet Explorer, and Edge can still be exploited. There are two reasons for this: First,
most of the latest proposed mitigation techniques require software or compiler tool chain changes
and thus could not be deployed promptly. For instance, ASLR-guard [33] is designed to thwart
information disclosure attacks, but requires compiler changes and cannot be quickly deployed by
software vendors. Second, the deployed mitigation techniques may fail due to newly invented
exploitation techniques (e.g., sandbox bypass technique). We argue that an ideal mitigation
technique should be flexible to deploy without requiring code changes and should subvert
inevitable exploitation stage(s).
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I observe that a typical JavaScript exploit adopts memory preparation to manipulate the
memory states. This is a critical stage for JavaScript exploits since attackers need to put
something (e.g., ROP chain, shellcode) into a known memory location prior to execution of that
code. This offers the chance for defenders to stop the exploits by disturbing this memory
preparation stage.
In this chapter, I propose C HAFFY S CRIPT, a vulnerability-agnostic mitigation system that
blocks JavaScript exploits via undermining the memory preparation stage. Specifically, given
suspicious JavaScript, C HAFFY S CRIPT rewrites the code to insert memory perturbation code, and
then generates semantically-equivalent code. JavaScript exploits will fail as a result of unexpected
memory states introduced by memory perturbation code, while the benign JavaScript still behaves
as expected since the memory perturbation code does not change the JavaScript’s original
semantics.
I have implemented a prototype of C HAFFY S CRIPT, which consists of three main
components: a memory allocation/free candidates discovery module to identify the potential
memory preparation operations, a lightweight type inference module to prune the unnecessary
memory preparation candidates, and a chaff code generation module to insert memory
perturbation code alongside memory preparation operations. As a demonstration of the
deployment flexibility afforded by our approach, we have integrated C HAFFY S CRIPT into a web
proxy to protect users against malicious HTML files. Our evaluation results show that: 1) the
probability of guessing the correct memory states after C HAFFY S CRIPT is extremely low
(Section 5.6.1), 2) C HAFFY S CRIPT can thwart the latest JavaScript exploits effectively
(Section 5.6.2) and 3) it incurs runtime overhead 5.88% for chrome and 12.96% for FireFox at
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most, and the memory overhead is 6.1% for the minimal JS heap usage, and 8.2% for the
maximal JS heap usage during runtime on Octane benchmark [91] (Section 5.6.3).

5.2

Technical background and motivation

5.2.1

Defense of JavaScript Exploits

Defense against JavaScript exploits has evolved to react to advances in exploitation
techniques. Any defensive techniques that stop one of the exploitation stages (described in
Figure 2.2) can prevent the exploits from infecting victim machines. Some exemplar defenses
include:

1) Cloaking the OS/software version during the pre-exploitation stage to stop attackers from
launching the correct exploits.
2) Tools like BrowserShield [26] instrument the execution of JavaScript to match the
predefined vulnerability feature and block the execution once a match is found.
3) Randomization-based techniques like Readactor [92] try to stop the attacks by preventing
memory disclosures.
4) Tools like ROPecker [55] exploits the Last Branch Record hardware feature to detect the
execution of ROP chains.
5) Control Flow Integrity (CFI) [27] based techniques [38, 50] are used to prevent execution
of injected payloads.
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While these exploitation mitigation techniques are constantly improving, hacking contests like
Pwn2Own [31], GeekPwn [32], etc., consistently demonstrate that the latest versions of Chrome,
Safari, Internet Explorer, and Edge can still be exploited. There are two reasons for this: First,
most of the latest proposed mitigation techniques require software or compiler tool chain changes
which may cause compatibility issues and thus cannot be deployed promptly. Second, the
deployed mitigation techniques may fail due to newly invented exploitation techniques. For
instance, DEP mitigation can be defeated by ROP attacks. The JITSpray [93] makes the ROP
defense useless since ROP is not needed anymore to bypass DEP in JITSpray based attack. To
conclusion, we argue that an ideal mitigation technique should be easy to deploy without the
change of code, and undermine the inevitable exploitation stages.

5.2.2

Memory Preparation

Based on our observations, the memory preparation stage is a critical stage for JavaScript
exploits because attackers need to put something (e.g., ROP, shellcode) into in a known memory
location prior to execution of that code. The memory preparation step can take many forms like
well-known heap spraying. While most of these techniques are difficult to detect with high
confidence, it often offers the first chance for defenders to detect that something malicious is
happening.

Memory Management of the JavaScript Engine Before the discussion of memory
preparation techniques, we first take V8 [94] as an example to present an overview of memory
management within a JavaScript engine. JavaScript engines dynamically manage memory for
running applications so that developers don’t need to worry about memory management like
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coding in C/C++. V8 divides the heap into several different spaces- a young generation, an old
generation, and a large object space. The young generation is divided into two contiguous spaces,
called semi-space. The old generation is separated into a map space and an old object space. The
map space exclusively contains all map objects while the rest of old objects go into the old space.
Each space is composed of a set of pages. A page is a contiguous chunk of memory, allocated
from the operating system with system call(e.g., mmap). Pages are always 1 MB in size and 1
MB aligned, except in a separate large object space. This separate space stores objects larger than
Page::kMaxHeapObjectSize, so that theses large objects are not moved during garbage collection
process.
The allocated objects will be put into different spaces based on their size, type, and age.
Garbage collection process are responsible for 1) scavenging young generation space my moving
live objects to the other semi-space when semi-space becomes full; 2) major collection of the
whole heap to free unreferenced objects and aggressive memory compaction to clean up
fragmented memory. The other JavaScript engines like SpiderMonkey [76], ChakraCore [95],
JavaScriptCore [96], etc.. share the similar design of memory management. Attackers commonly
abuse the memory management features to manipulate the memory states, known as memory
preparation.

Memory Preparation techniques Memory allocation and free operations are used to
manipulate the memory. We can categorize these techniques based upon how they change the
memory layout:

1) Emit data in a target address. This is usually implemented with a heap spray technique like
Heap Fengshui [97] and its successors [98]. These techniques spray crafted objects into the
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heap. The size and type of the objects are carefully chosen to exploit the memory
management of the JavaScript engine. ¶
2) Emit objects adjacent in memory. This is implemented by allocating two objects with the
same type and size sequentially so the JavaScript engine will likely keep them adjacent in
the heap; this technique is widely used by attackers. ·
3) Create holes in memory. This is implemented by allocating adjacent objects first, then
freeing one of them. A hole is created among those adjacent objects. ¸
4) De-fragment the heap. This is usually implemented via calling a garbage collection API
provided by host software (e.g., CollectGarbage() in IE) or via a carefully crafted
JavaScript snippet that forces the garbage collection process as discussed in Section 5.4.1.¹

In theory, attackers can use any JavaScript types to prepare memory, but in practice String
and Array are used most frequently. This is because the implementations of these two types,
especially Typed Array, are very close to native arrays in C/C++. Compared with the other
primitive types (Boolean, Null, Number, Symbol) and objects (e.g., Math), it is much easier to
control the content and layout of memory with these two types.
Realizing that memory preparation is an essential step towards successful JavaScript exploit, a
natural question rises in our mind - How can we disrupt this stage without code change of the host
software? The answer is: memory perturbation.
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Table 5.1: The overview of memory perturbation techniques
Category

Approaches

Storage

Aggregation
Ordering
Inserting

a. Split Variables
b. Change Encoding
c. Promote scalars to objects
d. convert static data to procedure
e. Merge scalar variables
f. Split, merge, fold, flatten arrays
g. Reorder instance variables
h. Reorder arrays
i. Insert noise data allocation/free
j. Insert holes into arrays

Memory
Change
1,2
1
1,2
1, 2
1,2
2
2
2
2
2

Code Transformation
Overhead
High
High
High
Medium
High
High
Medium
High
Low
High

1: content change 2: layout change

var A = true;
If(A){}

var c = 2017;
var x= 48;
var y =9;
C = x +y;

e

var a = [2, 3,
4, 5, 6,7]
var c = [1,2,3];
var d =c[2];

a

var c = 1;
var d = 0;
If(and(c,d)){}

c

var c = new
Number(2017);

var z = x <<32| y;
C = z>>32 + z &0xFFFFFFFF;
f.fold
f.flatten

h

var A=5;
C = A*2;

var s ="HELLO"

var b
=[2,3,4,5,6];

var b =[[2,3,4],
[5,6,7]]

var a =[6]
var b =[7]

var c=[3,2,1];
var d=c[0];

var a =[6];
var b =[7];

var d =[7,8,9];
var c = d[2];

var A=5^key;
C = A^key*2;

d

function getHello(){
var s="ABCDHELLO";
return s.substr(4,9);
}

f.split
f.merge

var b1 = [2,3];
var b2=[4,5,6];
var b =[7];
var a = [6];

i

var a =[6];
var noise = [8];
var b =[7];

var d = [7,8,hole,9]
Varc=d[3]

Fig. 5.1.: Samples of memory perturbation techniques summarized in Table 5.1

5.2.3

Memory Perturbation Techniques

Memory perturbation involves manipulation of the content or layout of memory without
changing the semantics of the code. This technique is similar to the data obfuscation technique
used in code obfuscation [88] to defeat malicious reverse engineering attacks. However, in the

82
context of JavaScript-based exploit defense, our goal is to subvert the memory preparation stage
through memory perturbation, so that exploits are defeated at runtime due to unpredictable
memory states.
Table 5.1 provides an overview of memory perturbation techniques. In general, memory
perturbation techniques can be divided into 4 categories as affecting the storage, aggregation,
ordering or inserting of the data in memory. Figure 5.1 presents sample code snippets for each of
the approaches referenced in Table 5.1. While each of the approaches can induce similar memory
changes in terms of memory layout or content, the overhead associated with each of these
approaches is quite different. For instance, Approach i only needs one statement insertion
operation for the code transformation. It does not need any further program analysis to keep the
semantics intact since the inserted statement does not affect the original code’s data and control
flow. However, Approach f requires additional program analysis to keep the program semantics
intact. This is because after the array is restructured, a whole program def-use analysis has to be
conducted to identify all the affected code and then update the code accordingly (update array
index, array name, etc.). Column D of Table 5.1 presents the code transformation overhead for
each approach.

5.2.4

Our Mitigation Solution

Based upon the previous discussion, we proposed a vulnerability-agnostic defense approach
for JavaScript exploits -C HAFFY S CRIPT. The basic idea of C HAFFY S CRIPT is to sabotage the
memory preparation stage via memory perturbation without changing the original JavaScript’s
semantics. Specifically, given suspicious JavaScript, C HAFFY S CRIPT rewrites the code to insert
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chaff code to perturb memory states, and then generates semantically-equivalent code. Since the
chaff code changes the memory states at runtime, JavaScript exploits will fail as a result of
unexpected memory states, while the benign JavaScript still executes as expected since the
transformed code by C HAFFY S CRIPT is semantics-equivalent. Compared with current mitigation
techniques, C HAFFY S CRIPT has the following advantages:

1) Vulnerability-agnostic nature. C HAFFY S CRIPT does not rely on any specific vulnerability
features as BrowserShield [26] does. Thus it is vulnerability-agnostic and can be used to
defend against 0-day attacks.
2) Flexible deployment. JavaScript rewriting can be implemented without the change of host
software. This makes the deployment of C HAFFY S CRIPT very flexible. Users can disable
or enable C HAFFY S CRIPT promptly based upon their needs.
3) Stronger protection. As evaluated in Section 5.6.1, C HAFFY S CRIPT provides much
stronger protection than randomization-based approaches (e.g., ASLRGuard [33]).

In the following sections, we will elaborate details on the threat model and scope, design and
implementation of C HAFFY S CRIPT.

5.3

Threat Model and Scope

We assume a commodity operating system with standard defense mechanisms, such as
no-executable stack and heap, and ASLR. We assume attackers are remote, so they do not have
physical access to the target system, nor do they have prior control over other programs before a
successful exploit.
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Memory Perturbation

Suspicious
JavaScript

Memory
Allocation/Free
Candidates
Discovery

Lightweight
Type Inference

Chaff Code
Generation

Defanged
JavaScript

Fig. 5.2.: The overall architecture of C HAFFY S CRIPT.

We assume an adversary uses JavaScript to exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities in a
program and achieve arbitrary code execution. We also assume that the adversary uses memory
preparation to manipulate the memory layout. This is a fair assumption since memory preparation
is a general stage used in the exploitation. We impose no restrictions on the exploitation
techniques.
Random number is used by C HAFFY S CRIPT to increase the difficulty of guessing the correct
memory states after memory perturbation techniques are deployed as discussed in Section 5.4.3.
So one assumption of C HAFFY S CRIPT is that the attacker cannot compromise random number
generator. This is a fair assumption since different secure random number generators [99] have
been deployed to stop such kind of attacks.
C HAFFY S CRIPT works against JavaScript exploits that require precise memory preparation.
These exploitations include but are not limited to control data attack, non-control data
attack [100], and side channel attack [56].
Out-of-scope threats. Cross-site scripting (XSS) [101] and Cross-site forgery(CSRF) [102]
are out of our scope.
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5.4

Design

In this section, we present the design of C HAFFY S CRIPT. Based on previous discussion, we
know that a successful JavaScript-based exploit requires sophisticated memory preparation. So
the goal of C HAFFY S CRIPT is to: undermine the memory preparation via memory perturbation
without changing the original JavaScript’s semantics.
In theory, all of the memory perturbation techniques discussed in Section 5.2.3 could be used
to undermine the memory preparation stages of JavaScript exploits. That said, to be practical an
on-line defense approach should incur minimal code transformation overhead and thus cannot
afford complex program analysis. With that in mind, we only apply Approach i in
C HAFFY S CRIPT for memory perturbation, which is good enough for defeating JavaScript
exploits as demonstrated in Section 5.6. Specifically, C HAFFY S CRIPT conducts JavaScript
rewriting by inserting chaff code to 1) allocate random chunks of memory along with existing
memory allocation operations, and 2) disable memory free operations by adding additional
reference to freed objects.
Figure 5.2 demonstrates the overview of C HAFFY S CRIPT. Given a suspicious JavaScript, it
first traverses the code to discover memory allocation/free candidates. Then a lightweight type
inference process is conducted on these candidates to identify the interesting memory
allocation/free candidates that are usually used for memory preparation by attackers; this reduces
unnecessary chaff code insertions and improves runtime performance. Finally, the chaff code is
generated and inserted into the original JavaScript code to get a defanged JavaScript. At runtime,
the chaff code will allocate random memory or disable memory free operations to undermine the
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memory preparation stage of JavaScript-based exploits. Benign JavaScript still executes normally
since the chaff code does not change the original code’s expected semantics.
Next, we will discuss the detailed design of the three C HAFFY S CRIPT modules: memory
allocation/free candidate discovery, lightweight type inference, and chaff code generation.

5.4.1

Memory Allocation/De-Allocation Candidate discovery

As discussed in Section 5.2, there are two kinds of operations that affect the memory state:
object allocation and de-allocation. C HAFFY S CRIPT inspects JavaScript code to identify the
following memory manipulation candidates:

Memory Allocation Candidates As discussed in Section 5.2.2, String and Array are two
common data types used by attackers to fill memory. C HAFFY S CRIPT traverses JavaScript code
to identify potential memory allocation candidates for String and Array operations. However,
precise type inference for JavaScript is quite expensive [103]. So, to be simple, the new
expression (e.g. var c = new Array(5)), value initialization expression (e.g.var c = [3,7]), and
built-in function callsite (e.g., var c = a.substr(0,10)) are all considered as memory allocation
candidates since they can trigger memory allocation in the heap. Note that the callee name can be
dynamically generated in JavaScript. Thus, we cannot statically determine if it is a targeted
built-in function callsite. To be complete, the callsites with dynamically generated callees are also
considered as memory allocation candidates. In JavaScript String objects are immutable, so
operations that change String objects (e.g. - the ’+’ and ’+=’ operators) will also cause memory
allocation. C HAFFY S CRIPT also considers expressions with the ’+’ and ’+=’ operators as
potential memory allocation candidates.
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Memory De-allocation Candidates In JavaScript, there are three ways to explicitly free
memory: assign null to the object, use the delete operator and explicitly trigger garbage
collection. The first two methods remove the reference to the allocated object. For instance,
delete object.property removes the reference to the property object. However, it does not directly
free the property object in memory. When the property object is no longer referenced by any
other objects, garbage collection process will eventually free it in memory. C HAFFY S CRIPT still
considers null assignment and delete calls as memory de-allocation candidates because attackers
often use them to create holes in memory, so objects allocated later can fill these holes to trigger
some vulnerabilities (e.g.,Use-after-Free).
Explicit garbage collection (GC) calls are usually used by attackers to defragment the
heap [1]. Some browsers like Internet Explorer and Opera provide public APIs (e.g.,
CollectGarbage() for IE) to trigger garbage process. C HAFFY S CRIPT can easily identify this kind
of garbage collection process by matching the API name. However, the other browsers’ garbage
collection process can only be triggered when certain memory states are achieved; in these cases
there are no APIs to explicitly trigger the process. In these cases, attackers usually fill objects in
memory to trigger the garbage collection process. For instance, the following code can fill up the
1MB semi-space page of V8 engine and force V8 to scavenge NewSpace.
1

f o r ( v a r i = 0 ; i < ( ( 1 0 2 4 * 1 0 2 4 ) / 0 x10 ) ; i ++)

2

{
v a r a = new S t r i n g ( ) ;

3

4

}
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This kind of GC trigger is implicit and difficult to identify. Nevertheless, it includes memory
allocation operations and will be considered as a memory allocation candidate and will still be
captured by C HAFFY S CRIPT. GC events using DOM objects instead of String and Array are not
captured by C HAFFY S CRIPT, but this is only one of the memory preparation techniques used by
attacker. Furthermore, JavaScript exploits usually combine multiple memory preparation
techniques, thus allowing C HAFFY S CRIPT to be effective even when hybrid memory preparation
methods are used.
The host software also provides APIs to allocate and free objects. For instance, on browser,
users can adopt the DOM API to add or remove node objects from the DOM tree. While in
theory, it is possible for attackers to manipulate those APIs during memory preparation, as
discussed in Section 5.2.2, it is challenging to do that since the layout and content of DOM
objects are difficult to control. If new memory preparation techniques are applied by attackers,
C HAFFY S CRIPT just needs to update the memory allocation/de-allocation candidate discovery
stage to block those techniques.

5.4.2

Lightweight Type Inference

The collection of memory allocation candidates is a superset of the memory allocation
candidates of String and Array objects. If we insert chaff code along with all the candidates, the
runtime performance would be unacceptable. To improve the runtime performance of defanged
JavaScript, we conduct lightweight type inference to prune the memory allocation candidates that
are not related to String and Array objects. It is executed as two steps: static type inference and
dynamic type inference.
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Static type inference

C HAFFY S CRIPT only keeps the memory allocation candidates that

operate on variables typed as one of String, Array, ArrayBuffer, Int8Array, Uint8Array,
Uint8ClampedArray, Int16Array, Uint16Array, Int32Array, Uint32Array, Float32Array, and
Float64Array. We can infer the types of the variables in expressions statically based upon how
they are used. C HAFFY S CRIPT uses the three following type inference rules:
1) the constructor of the new operator indicates the type of created object. For instance, the
constructor Int16Array in var b = new Int16Array(256) indicates the type of b is
Int16Array.
2) the return value of a built-in function indicates the type based on its description. For
instance, var c = s.split(”a”) indicates that the type of c is Array.
3) for expressions with the ’+’ or ’+=’ operators, if the type of the operands are String, then
the result is also a String.
These three simple rules do not require complex program analysis and can be used to efficiently
determine the type of variables to filter out the memory allocation candidates. If static type
inference cannot determine the types of all the variables used in memory allocation candidates,
dynamic type inference are conducted to check the type at runtime.

Dynamic type inference Static type inference does not always work for two reasons. First,
since a function call’s name can be dynamically generated, we cannot determine an object’s type
based upon the function’s return value. Second, the three typing rules are very weak and cannot
determine the type of variables in some cases. For instance, the three typing rules cannot be
applied on candidates var d = a + b + c. It is possible to determine the type of a, b and c via
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backward analysis, but that is likely too expensive for our online defense system use case.
Instead, we conduct dynamic type inference with the help of JavaScript features. In JavaScript, a
variable’s type can be extracted at runtime using the instanceof operator. With this operator,
C HAFFY S CRIPT inserts the dynamic type inference after the memory allocation candidate to
check if it operates on targeted types. While dynamic type inference incurs runtime performance
overhead, it is less expensive than statically inferring the type of variables.
Our static type inference is very conservative; any untyped variables are enforced to conduct
dynamic type inference. As a result, the dynamic type inference makes it impossible for attackers
to bypass our type inference process.

5.4.3

Chaff Code Generation

The goal of inserted chaff code is to affect the memory states at runtime. It achieves this goal
via the following two methods.

disable memory free operations. For memory free candidates using public APIs like
CollectGarbage() in IE, C HAFFY S CRIPT directly removes the API call from the original code.
This does not change the semantics of original JavaScript code because garbage collection APIs
does not have data or control dependency on the original code.
For memory free candidates using the delete operator or assigning a null value, the above
method does not work because simply removing such code will change the semantics of the
original code. The attackers’ goal of freeing an object is to create holes in memory, so later
allocated objects can occupy the freed memory. If we keep a reference to the object before the free
operation is executed, the later allocated object can not occupy the position since the allocated
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memory still has a reference to it. Figure 5.7.(a,b) illustrates an example of such transformation.
In code snippet [a], x is assigned the value null. In the transformed code [b], C HAFFY S CRIPT has
added a new variable 4613335ea9901 to store a reference to ”abcdefgh”. Although x is assigned
to null, the object ”abcdefgh” will not be scavenged since 4613335ea9901 keeps a reference to it.
var x = ” abcdefgh ” ;
var x = ” abcdefgh ” ;
v a r 4613335 e a 9 9 0 1 = x ;
x = null ;
x = null ;
console . log ( x ) ;
console . log ( x ) ;

[a]

[b]
v a r y = new A r r a y B u f f e r ( 1 0 2 4 ) ;

v a r y = new A r r a y B u f f e r ( 1 0 2 4 ) ;

[c]

v a r e 5 1 2 d a 1 9 5 1 c d d 7 = new A r r a y B u f f e r ( y . b y t e L e n g t h + RANDOM) ;
93 f 2 0 8 8 7 6 c d 2 b d . p u s h ( e 5 1 2 d a 1 9 5 1 c d d 7 ) ;

[d]
Fig. 5.3.: Chaff code Samples

Insert chaff code following the memory allocation candidate. As discussed in Section 5.2, if
two objects of the same type are allocated sequentially and with the same size, it is likely their
positions on heap are adjacent to each other. Attackers exploit this feature to manipulate the
memory layout and content. C HAFFY S CRIPT is also able to exploit this detail to defeat this
exploit. After every memory allocation candidate, C HAFFY S CRIPT insert code to allocate
additional memory with the same type, but with variable-length padding at the end(RANDOM).
Figure 5.7([c],[d]) presents an example of such code transformation. As you see in code snippet
[d], a new ArrayBuffer is allocated with size (y.byteLength + RANDOM). With this randomness,
it is almost impossible for attackers to guess the combinations of memory states as evaluated in
Section 5.6.1.
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To generate RANDOM, C HAFFY S CRIPT provides two approaches to increase an attacker’s
uncertainty. The first one is at runtime; every time the inserted chaff code is executed, a new
random number is generated for RANDOM. So if a given piece of chaff code is executed 1000
times, and the range of RANDOM is 0-50, it will create 501000 possible memory states at runtime.
The second approach happens when we are inserting the chaff code into original JavaScript code;
a random number is generated for RANDOM. This value is used to randomly increase the size of
the memory chunk allocated by this piece of chaff code. For example, if 15 places are inserted by
the chaff code, and the range of RANDOM is 0-50, 5015 possible memory states will be created at
runtime. Both approaches can defeat the JavaScript exploits with different security guarantees
and performance overhead as discussed in Section 5.6.
The range of RANDOM cannot be too big. Otherwise, the objects allocated by chaff code
might be allocated in a different location. Thus that fails to break adjacent arrays (·). In our
implementation, we set it as 0-50. This range works against memory preparation techniques while
providing enough randomness as demonstrated in Section 5.6.1.
Since our inserted code is independent of the original code, attackers may abuse garbage
collection to scavenge the allocated chaff memory and neutralize the effects of inserted chaff
code. To avoid this, C HAFFY S CRIPT keeps a reference to every allocated piece of chaff memory.
This prevents scavenging of chaff memory by the garbage collection process because there is
always at least one reference to the allocated chaff memory. We call the added code as GC
escaper.
The variable names used in the chaff code are generated randomly. This prevents attackers
from identifying memory allocated by the chaff code alongside their own memory preparation
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code. Thus attackers cannot leverage variable naming conventions to identify memory used as
part of our countermeasures, thus making bypass of these countermeasures impossible.

5.5

Implementation

We implemented C HAFFY S CRIPT using esprima [104]. It is a JavaScript parser used to
generate Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) with full support for ECMAScript 6. Since it is written
using JavaScript, it can be easily embedded into different documents like HTML or PDF. This
makes the deployment very flexible. Estraverse [105] is used to traverse the AST, discover
memory allocation/free candidates and perform lightweight type inference. The chaff code
insertion is implemented via directly manipulating the original code with the offset information
collected from AST generation process. We do not operate on AST directly to insert the chaff
code because generation code from AST is more expensive than from manipulating original code.
Section 5.6.3 evaluates the difference of rewriting performance for these two approaches.
The general workflow of C HAFFY S CRIPT can be summarized in the following steps:
1) C HAFFY S CRIPT takes JavaScript code as input and derives its AST.
2) C HAFFY S CRIPT traverses the generated AST to discover memory allocation/free
candidates and conduct lightweight type inference.
3) C HAFFY S CRIPT generates chaff code snippets and inserts them into the original JavaScript
code to generate the defanged JavaScript.
The deployment of C HAFFY S CRIPT is very flexible. It can be deployed as a browser
extension, a web proxy, a standalone rewriting engine or one component of a JavaScript engine.
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In this section, we demonstrated one deployment approach to protect users against malicious
HTML files.

5.5.1

HTML Protector

Ideally, it is most user-friendly to deploy C HAFFY S CRIPT as a browser extension.
Unfortunately, JavaScript rewrite, used to implement code transformation in C HAFFY S CRIPT, is
not natively supported in browser extensions. Instead, we deploy C HAFFY S CRIPT as a web
proxy. The downside is that a user needs to install an external program (and certificate) as
opposed to only an extension. The benefit is that this proxy-based solution is
browser-independent and can be easily deployed with minimal configuration.
The prototype was implemented in Node.js [106], using the http-mitm-proxy package [107].
C HAFFY S CRIPT becomes an integral part of the Web proxy. We followed Dachshund [53]’s
approach to handle dynamically generated code. Specifically, the dynamic code generation
functions (e.g.,eval, SetTimeout, Function, SetInterval) were hooked via new injected JavaScript
code. To rewrite dynamically generated code, we used synchronous XMLHttpRequest requests
from hooked JavaScript functions to the proxy. The response from the proxy contains the
defanged JavaScript code.

5.5.2

Possible implementation of PDF protector

While we did not, it is possible to integrate C HAFFY S CRIPT as a standalone rewrite engine to
protect users against malicious PDF files. We can adopt peepdf[108] to extract JavaScript from
PDF files and write the defanged JavaScript back. For dynamically generated code, we can use
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the same approach as HTML protector. For instance, Net.HTTP can be used to pass dynamically
generated code to the rewrite engine, and retrieve the defanged code.
The attacker may embed malicious JavaScript in an unusual way as demonstrated in [109] to
evade the JavaScript extraction. Thus the embedded malicious JavaScript will be ignored by
peepdf, and PDF protector fails to protect users against such malicious PDF files. It is always
possible for attackers to find new methods to hide the malicious JavaScript code in PDF files.
However, this is not a weakness of C HAFFY S CRIPT. Extraction of JavaScript from malicious
PDF files is another security problem and out of C HAFFY S CRIPT’s scope. Future work could
look at leveraging new JavaScript extraction techniques to improve the implementation of PDF
protector. For instance, one solution is to leverage the state-of-art JavaScript Extractor developed
in [109] to confirm that peepdf has extracted all of the embedded JavaScript code in a PDF file.

5.6

Evaluation

In this section, we present the evaluation of C HAFFY S CRIPT. The evaluation tries to answer
the following questions:

1) How secure is C HAFFY S CRIPT’s approach in theory, compared to general randomization
approaches?
2) How secure is C HAFFY S CRIPT’s approach against practical JavaScript-based exploits?
3) How much overhead does C HAFFY S CRIPT impose, in particular rewriting, runtime, and
space?
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Experimental setup. We conducted our evaluations of C HAFFY S CRIPT to check its security
enhancements and potential performance impacts. The performance overhead experiment was run
under Chrome 57 and Firefox 54. All the experiments are conducted on a test machine equipped
with intel Core i7-4790 CPU @ 3.60GHz 8 with 16GB RAM.

5.6.1

Security Analysis

In this subsection, we present an analysis to determine the probability that an attacker could
predict the memory layout after memory perturbation is introduced by C HAFFY S CRIPT. The
randomness introduced by C HAFFY S CRIPT is determined by the following parameters:
1) RANDOM - the size variation range of created object by chaff code.
2) M - number of inserted chaff code.
3) N - executed times of chaff code at runtime.
The probability of guessing the correct memory states is defined as the follow equation.
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
-M
⎪
⎪
predef ine RAN DOM
⎪
⎪RAN DOM
probability = ⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
RAN DOM -N Gen RAN DOM at runtime
⎪
⎪
⎩
If RANDOM is predefined when C HAFFY S CRIPT inserts the chaff code, the probability is
RAN DOM -M . If a random number is generated for RANDOM every time the chaff code is
executed, the probability is RAN DOM -N . If it is too big, the allocated objects by chaff code
may not be adjacent to the objects allocated by original code. Thus it cannot break memory
preparation ·. In our implementation, we set RANDOM as 50 and it worked well on defeating
JavaScript exploits as evaluated in Section 5.6.2.
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The value of M and N is case by case. Column 4 and Column 5 in Table 5.2 records the value
of M and N for 10 exploits. The average of M was 15, and average of N was 130876. The
probability for JavaScript exploits in our implementation should be 50-15 and 50-130876 . This
provides much stronger randomness than ASLR [33] (2-64 at most). The highest probability of
the 10 exploits was 50-10 which is still stronger than 2-56 . Through this analysis, we conclude that
the probability for an attacker to predict the memory layout is extremely low after memory
perturbation is introduced by C HAFFY S CRIPT.
Table 5.2: Experimental results of 10 latest JavaScript-based exploits using C HAFFY S CRIPT
CVE
CVE-2015-2419
CVE-2015-1233
CVE-2015-6086
CVE-2015-6764
CVE-2016-9079
ms16-063
(cve-2016-3202)
CVE-2016-1646
chromev8 OOB write
X360 videoPlayerActiveX

setup
IE11
32bit WIN7
chrome 41.0.2272.118
WIN10 32bit
IE11
32bit WIN7
chrome 46.0.2490.0
WIN10 32bit
FireFox 50.0.1 32bit
Windows8.1
IE11
WIN7 32bit
chrome46.0.2490.0
WIN10 32bit
chrome60.0.3080.5
linux14.04 64bit
VideoPlayerActiveX 2.6
IE10 WIN7 64bit

MemoryPreparation

M

N

Defeated?

¶·¹

28

12594

Y

¶·¹

9

8194

Y

¸¹

12

1280

Y

¶·¹

14

393224

Y

¶ · ¹(JITSpray)
¶·¹

13
28

20564
17408

Y
Y

¶·¸¹

12

110005

Y

¶·¹

18

393226

Y

·

10

10

Y

¶·

9

352258

Y

M: # of inserted chaff code N: Executed times # of chaff code at runtime

5.6.2

Effectiveness

Although in theory C HAFFY S CRIPT can stop JavaScript exploits, we wanted to know how
well it performed at defeating real JavaScript exploits without the knowledge of the targeted
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BuggyArray(0x80)

FixedArray(0x18)

FixedDoubleArray(0x20)

JSArray(0x30)

JSArray(0x30)

FixedArray(0x18)

ArrayBuffer

Fig. 5.4.: Expected memory layout of sample chromev8 OOB write

vulnerabilities. To do that, we set up exploitation environments for 10 exploits and confirmed that
without C HAFFY S CRIPT, all 10 of these exploits functioned correctly. These 10 exploits are
representative of latest JavaScript exploits because:
1) The vulnerabilities targeted by these 10 exploits are quite new (from 2015 to 2016).
2) The target host software of these exploits covered the most popular web browsers (IE11,
Chrome, and Firefox)
3) These 10 exploits used all of the memory preparation techniques presented in Column 3 in
Table 5.2.
4) These 10 exploits covered the popular exploitation techniques - JITSpray and HeapSpray.
5) These 10 exploits not only targeted at vulnerabilities in host software, but also in the
browser plugin (X360 videoPlayerActiveX).
For every exploit, we manually confirmed that it could be stopped using C HAFFY S CRIPT.
Column 6 in Table 5.2 presents the result. As shown in the results, C HAFFY S CRIPT defeated all
10 of the exploits without requiring knowledge of vulnerabilities targeted. This experiment proves
that C HAFFY S CRIPT can effectively defeat JavaScript exploits without knowledge of the targeted
vulnerability.
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BuggyArray(0x80)

Chaff Memory

FixedArray(0x18)

Chaff Memory FixedDoubleArray(0x20) Chaff Memory
Chaff Memory

ArrayBuffer

Chaff Memory

JSArray(0x30)

JSArray(0x30)

Chaff Memory FixedArray(0x18)

Chaff Memory

Fig. 5.5.: Memory layout of sample chromev8 OOB write after rewritten by C HAFFY S CRIPT

Note that the chaff codes inserted into the sample chromev8 OOB write are only executed
10 times, but still thwart the exploit. This is not like the other samples, in which the chaff codes
are executed thousands of times and change the memory states substantially. In fact, the memory
preparation of this exploit expects the memory layout as shown in Figure 5.4. After the chaff code
is inserted, the actual memory layout is close to the layout as shown in Figure 5.5. The chaff
memory breaks adjacent array layout(·). Therefore, the memory preparation of this exploit fails
and this exploit is thwarted eventually. This case further demonstrates the effectiveness of
memory perturbation used in C HAFFY S CRIPT since it uses very few memory perturbation
operations.

5.6.3

Performance

Rewriting Overhead In order to evaluate the rewriting overhead of C HAFFY S CRIPT, we chose
to measure the three popular and large JavaScript libraries - JQuery (mobile-1.4.2), AngularJS
(1.2.5), and React (0.13.3). These libraries are commonly embedded in web pages and relatively
large compared with other JavaScript applications (JQuery has 443KB, AngularJS has 702KB,
React has 587KB). For the evaluation, we rewrote these libraries using C HAFFY S CRIPT 1000
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Fig. 5.6.: Rewriting Performance on well-known JavaScript libraries

times. We measured the time required to rewrite these libraries, including all the steps required to
generate defanged JavaScript.
We tested two code transformation approaches. The first approach modified the code directly
based upon the offset information collected by the JavaScript parser. The second approach
modified code within the AST. As demonstrated in Figure 5.6. The time spent by the second
approach is 1.67 times more than the first approach. C HAFFY S CRIPT chose the first approach in
the implementation. On average, It took 1̃00ms to rewrite JQuery, AngularJS, and React. Note
that rewriting is a one-time effort and we can further optimize performance by rewriting multiple
scripts concurrently.

Runtime Overhead Next, we evaluated the runtime performance that is incurred on the client
side due to the modified JavaScript code. We leverage Octane, a commonly-used benchmark for
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Fig. 5.7.: Runtime performance overhead under different configurations

Table 5.3: Overall Overhead of C HAFFY S CRIPT on Octane benchmark
Cofiguration
a. Runtime Generated RANDOM + GC escaper
b. Runtime Generated RANDOM
c. Predefined RANDOM + GC escaper
d. Predefined RANDOM

Chrome
5.88%
4.54%
5.68%
4.53%

Firefox
12.96%
7.98%
11.27%
6.60%

JavaScript engines [91]. For the evaluation, we ran the Octane benchmarks 5 times and used the
mean scores as the final results.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the breakdown of Octane benchmark results. The performance varies
quite a lot for different applications. This is because the runtime overhead is mainly caused by the
inserted chaff code and the number of times that it is executed at runtime, which is very
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Table 5.4: Memory Overhead of Chrome on Octane benchmark
Usage
Min(MB)
Max(MB)

Original
34.4
609

a
36.5(6.10%)
659(8.2%)

b
36.5(6.10%)
656(7.71%)

c
36.5(6.10%)
640(5.09%)

d
36.4(5.81%)
638(4.76%)

a, b, c , d refers to the four C HAFFY S CRIPT configurations described in Table 5.3

application dependent. Table 5.3 summarizes the overall overhead on the Octane benchmark
under different C HAFFY S CRIPT configurations. With the strongest protection, C HAFFY S CRIPT
incurs 5.88% overhead in Chrome, and 12.96% in FireFox. With the weakest protection,
C HAFFY S CRIPT incurs 4.53% in Chrome and 6.60% in Firefox. As discussed in Section 5.6.1,
the weakest protection can still provide an acceptable randomness strength. Note that our threat
model is only relevant to non-trusted and attacker-controlled JavaScript. Thus the overhead of
popular JavaScript libraries can be eliminated by whitelisting trusted scripts. This overhead after
the whitelisting should allow C HAFFY S CRIPT to be deployed online to protect users against
JavaScript exploits.

Memory Overhead In theory, the memory overhead should be around 2 times at most. This is
because along with each object allocation, C HAFFY S CRIPT could allocate another object with a
similar size to disturb memory states. If all of the inserted objects by chaff code are not freed
finally by Garbage Collector, the memory usage of the defanged JavaScript should be 2 times of
the original JavaScript.
To evaluate the actual memory overhead, we ran Octane on Chrome and recorded the memory
usage of JavaScript heap. Table 5.4 summarizes the results. Min refers to the observed minimal
memory usage of JavaScript heap during the running of Octane, while Max refers to the observed
maximal memory usage. As demonstrated in the table, for all four different C HAFFY S CRIPT
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configurations, the memory overhead never exceeded 8.2%. This is not a big overhead since RAM
has become very cheap and current personal computers are usually equipped with at least 8GB
memory. Thus, C HAFFY S CRIPT can be deployed by users without requiring upgraded hardware.
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6. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
6.1

Conclusion

The original thesis was that enriched executions can be leveraged to combat malicious
JavaScript. More Specifically, the proposed techniques explore arbitrary paths for detection,
preserve JS-binary semantics for diagnosis, and perturb memory with chaff code for mitigation.
This thesis has been validated in this dissertation.
JSForce demonstrated that it could tolerate invalid object accesses while increasing code
coverage and introducing no runtime errors during execution. As an amplifier technique, JSForce
does not rely on any predefined profile information or full-fledged hosting programs like browsers
or PDF viewers, and it can examine partial JavaScript snippets collected during an attack.
JSForce can be leveraged to greatly improve the detection rate of other dynamic analysis systems
without modification of their detection policies.
JScalpel showed that by bridging the semantic gap between the JavaScript level and binary
level to perform dynamic JS-Binary analysis, we are able to determine the payload injection and
exploitation statements of the JavaScript exploits. Thus a minimized exploit and POV can be
automatically created for exploit signature generation and penetration test.
ChaffyScript illustrated that an enriched execution with memory perturbation could undermine
the memory preparation stage in JavaScript exploits and thus blocks the attack. Moreover, the
deployment of ChaffyScript is very flexible and requires no code change of host software.
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var f = function ( ) {
if ( true ) {
function g ( ) { r e t u r n 1;}
} else {
function g ( ) { r e t u r n 2;}
};

function g () { return 3;};
return g () ;
function g ( ) { r e t u r n 4;}

7
8
9
10

}

Fig. 6.1.: A JavaScript Sample Interpreted Differently by Different JavaScript Engines

The core of Enriched Executions is composed of these three techniques to combat malicious
JavaScript. They can be deployed independently on different server or together on the same
server. More specially, JSForce and JScalpel can be deployed on the server to provide off-line
analysis to capture and diagnose malicious JavaScript. ChaffyScript can be deployed either on the
end user’s machine or on the web proxy server to protect against malicious JavaScript. Enriched
Executions combines these three techniques together to effectively defeat malicious JavaScript.

6.2

Limitations and Future Work

6.2.1

Detection

If the syntax of the tested JavaScript code is not correct, JSForce drops the analysis
immediately. The forced execution can introduce syntax error under some cases. For instance, the
parameter of eval is supposed to be correct JavaScript code. When the parameter is calculated
from faked strings created by JSForce, the parameter may become syntax incorrect for eval. In
the future, we expect to develop techniques [110] to automatically fix the syntax error to enable
maximized execution of the code.
While JavaScript language has the official specification from the ECMAScript
community [68], the implementation of the language on different JavaScript engines differs
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slightly because of the complex features and rapid evolving of JavaScript language. The attacker
can exploit this weakness to create a deliberate script which exhibits differently on JSForce to
evade the analysis. Maffeis et al. [111] discussed such an example presented in Figure 6.1. This
code defines a function f whose behavior is given by one of the declarations of g inside the body
of the anonymous function that returns g. However, different implementations disagree on which
declaration determines the behavior of f. Specifically, a call to f() should return 4, according to
ECMA specification. SpiderMonkey returns 4, while Rhino and Safari return 1, and JScript and
the ECMA4 reference implementations return 2. Attackers can leverage these differences to hide
the decoding key and evade analysis. To counter this, we can implement JSForce on top of
different JavaScript engines, such as SpiderMonkey [76] and Chakra [95].
The current path exploration algorithm can efficiently explore most of the sample in a decent
time. However, there are still some cases that take a considerable length of time to finish. To
exploit this limitation, attackers may place the malicious code deep in the code logic, such that
JSForce could not reach it within a predefined duration. Note that this limitation is not unique for
JSForce. All the path exploration techniques share the same limitation. We leave it as future work
to develop better path exploration algorithms and search heuristics.
JSForce can be evaded by techniques that do not need control-flow branches, e.g., those based
on browser or JavaScript quirks. For example, the property window.innerW idth is defined in
FireFox and Chrome but undefined in Internet Explorer. Therefore, a malicious code that
computed a decoding key from window.innerW idth would obtain a different result in
Firefox/Chrome and IE, and could be used to decode malicious code in specific browsers.
JSForce will not trigger the malicious code path in such cases and can be evaded.
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14

xxxxx = ’ ev ’ ;
yyyyy = ’ a l ’ ;
z z z z z = xxxxx + yyyyy ;
a a a a a = app ;
t r y {} c a t c h ( e ) {
zzzzz = 1;
aaaaa = 1;
}
try {
d = nothis nothis ;
zzzzz = 1;
aaaaa = 1;
} c a t c h ( e ) {}
a a a a a [ z z z z z ] ( ’ ddddd ’ + ’ dd= une ’ + ’ s c a ’ / * * / + / * * / ’ pe ; ’ ) ;

Fig. 6.2.: The Case of Evading JSForce

Figure 6.2 presents an example that can bypass JSForce. Using normal JavaScript engine,
lines 6-7 and lines 11-12 will not be executed so that aaaaa and zzzzz can be correctly
initialized. However, with JSForce, line 10 will not raise the exception since d will be initialized
as F akedObject. The exponential path exploration can handle this case by exploring all the
possible path combinations. But it is not feasible in practice. Our solution is that we execute the
sample without forced execution when we collect the path predicates at the beginning.

6.2.2

Diagnosis

Vulnerabilities within Filtered Modules If the vulnerability exploited exists within the filtered
modules, the slicer produces the incomplete slice. Current implementation of JScalpel can not
detect exploits that target the filtered modules. In the future, fine-grained analysis can be applied
on these modules to determine which part of the code introduces the dependency and then limit
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the filter from whole module to some specific code range. This will reduce the number of
vulnerabilities that JScalpel cannot handle.

Debug-Resistant JavaScript In order for JScalpel to be able to analyze a script, it is important
that JScalpel executes the program and monitors from the debugger. Though we did not find any
samples that can detect debuggers, it is possible that exploits could use techniques (e.g.,
timing-based) to determine if a debugger is running and hide the malicious behavior. Currently,
JScalpel is vulnerable to such attacks. It would be an interesting future work to reconstruct
JavaScript-level semantics directly from the Virtual Machine Monitor, similar to how
DroidScope [112]) recovers Java/Dalvik level semantic view.

Impact of JIT-Enabled JavaScript Engine on JScalpel

When JIT is enabled on JavaScript

engine, the data flow within JavaScript engine becomes more complex because of the mixture of
code and data. JScalpel may not work in this case. Since JScalpel is designed as an analysis tool
and is not performance sensitive, the analyst can simply disable the JIT engine. However, this
workaround would sacrifice the capability of analyzing attacks that perform JIT spray, as these
attacks rely on the side-effects of the JIT compiler. We leave it as future work to address this issue.

6.2.3

Mitigation

In general, ChaffyScript has the following limitations:
First, attackers may find methods to bypass the JavaScript rewriting process. For instance,
lexer confusing attacks [113] confuse the lexer causing executable code to be interpreted as the
content of strings or comments, allowing an attacker to slip arbitrary unsafe code past a rewriter
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or verifier. The rewriter of ChaffyScript is vulnerable to this attack. In the future, we would like to
adopt JaTE’s [114] approach by considering all formats of JavaScript comments to gain resilience
to this attack. It is also possible to attack the JavaScript parser esprima with crafted JavaScript. As
a result, the parser will fail and further code transformation cannot be conducted by ChaffyScript.
Fortunately, ChaffyScript can identify such attacks because it can detect esprima errors.
ChaffyScript can alert security researchers for further analysis once such failures are observed.
Second, the JavaScript extraction approach used in deployment may undermine ChaffyScript.
Attackers may hide JavaScript in an unusual way to escape from the extraction, thus preventing
ChaffyScript from rewriting those portions. For instance, attackers may abuse PDF parsers to hide
malicious JavaScript code [109]. This is not a ChaffyScript issue, but rather is a JavaScript
extractor issue. Deployment of a state-of-art JavaScript extractor with ChaffyScript would reduce
the risk of such attacks.
Third, ChaffyScript does not work on hybrid JavaScript exploits. Basically, such kind of
exploits use JavaScript to trigger the vulnerability, and use other script language (e.g.,
ActionScript in Flash) to prepare the memory. This is quite common in recently years since
vector-related rehabilitates in Flash are quite exploit-friendly, allowing construction of arbitrary
memory read/write primitives [115]. However, it is possible to deploy the techniques used in
ChaffyScript on ActionScript to stop such attacks as discussed in the following subsection.
Fourth, attackers may find other objects to prepare the memory instead of String and Array
operations targeted by ChaffyScript. Once these new memory preparation techniques are
identified, ChaffyScript just needs an update to its memory allocation/free candidate discovery
process to reflect the new memory preparation technique.
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Applicability on the other script-based exploits

JavaScript is not the only script language that can be used to launch exploits; other script
languages like VBScript [116] and ActionScript [117] are commonly used to launch exploits.
These script-based exploits are widely used to create malicious Microsoft Documents (word,
excel, powerpoint,etc.), flash files, web pages [118]. So the questions rises in our mind - Can
ChaffyScript be applied to stop the other script-based exploits?
The answer is yes because of the following reasons:
1) Script-based languages share a similar memory management approach. They all use some
sort of garbage collector to recycle the memory and conduct automatic garbage collection at
runtime.
2) Memory preparation is a general stage in exploits. Attackers require this stage to bypass
mitigation techniques like ASLR, CFG [38] with crafted memory. This stage is also used
by the other script-based exploits.
3) Other script-based languages also execute interpretively and can be rewritten as JavaScript.
This allows ChaffyScript to provide the protection via rewriting.
To demonstrate this, we set up the exploitation environment for CVE-2016-0189 [119]. It is a
VBScript-based exploit targeting a VBScript memory corruption in IE11. We manually applied
ChaffyScript’s rewriting process and insert the memory perturbation code. The test shows that
this exploit is successfully blocked by memory perturbation. This demonstrates that ChaffyScript
can also be applied to stop the other script-based exploits.
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To apply ChaffyScript on the other script language, we need the corresponding script parser,
and also need to adapt the lightweight typing rules on the new script language since different
languages support different typing systems. These adaptations are feasible and can be
implemented with engineering efforts.
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44. A. Taly, Ú. Erlingsson, J. C. Mitchell, M. S. Miller, and J. Nagra, “Automated analysis of security-critical javascript apis,” in Security and
Privacy (SP), 2011 IEEE Symposium on, pp. 363–378, IEEE, 2011.

45. S. Bandhakavi, S. T. King, P. Madhusudan, and M. Winslett, “Vex: Vetting browser extensions for security vulnerabilities.,” in USENIX
Security Symposium, vol. 10, pp. 339–354, 2010.

46. D. Liu, H. Wang, and A. Stavrou, “Detecting malicious javascript in pdf through document instrumentation,” in Dependable Systems and
Networks (DSN), 2014 44th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on, 2014.

47. K. Rieck, T. Krueger, and A. Dewald, “Cujo: efficient detection and prevention of drive-by-download attacks,” in Proceedings of the 26th
Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 2010.

48. S. Chen, K. Pattabiraman, Z. Kalbarczyk, and R. K. Iyer, “Formal reasoning of various categories of widely exploited security vulnerabilities
using pointer taintedness semantics,” in Security and Protection in Information Processing Systems, 2004.

49. A. Slowinska and H. Bos, “The age of data: pinpointing guilty bytes in polymorphic buffer overflows on heap or stack,” in 23rd Annual
Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC’07), December 2007.
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